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Abstract 
 
In this report I argue that one of the ways in which it is possible for a person to be 
capable of more meaningful achievements and to engage in more meaningful activities is 
to become a cyborg.  Cyborgs have enhanced abilities as a result of implants that connect 
the brain to mechanical prostheses or other additions such as synthetic muscles or skin. I 
argue that activities and achievements are meaningful in virtue of developing or 
expressing what is most admirably ‘human’ about us and that many cybernetic 
enhancements allow for the substantial development or expression of our valuably human 
capacities.  Since I suspect that there would be considerable resistance to the idea that 
becoming a cyborg could contribute meaning to a life, I spend a substantial amount of 
space to responding to possible objections to my account.  I argue that cybernetic 
enhancements need not threaten the development of virtues or other skills, or eliminate 
effort or suffering.  They also need not make us other than what we are to such an extent 
that the meaningfulness they make possible is undermined.  Furthermore, the 
meaningfulness enhancements can contribute to lives need not be undermined by ethical 
considerations, or by the common intuition that meaningfulness depends on how one 
responds within the circumstances presented to one, not the abilities that one has.  
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Introduction 
 
In this paper I argue that becoming a cyborg and thereby increasing the amount of 
meaningful activities and achievements one is capable of is one way in which one can 
increase the meaningfulness of one’s life.  I do not claim that all enhancements increase 
meaningfulness of a life: only certain enhancements do and only when used in certain 
ways.  I argue that meaningful activities and achievements are those that develop and 
express what is most admirably human about us, namely our capacities for rational 
thought and certain emotion, and that cybernetic enhancements allow us to develop and 
express these capacities by allowing us to engage in more activities that make their 
expression and development possible.  In order to show that this is plausible I defend the 
claim that increasing the amount of meaningful parts that a life contains can increase the 
meaningfulness of a life, as well as show why certain consequences of becoming 
enhanced do not undermine meaningfulness.   
 
In Chapter One I introduce the main question that I consider in this paper, namely, 
whether cybernetic enhancements can increase the meaningfulness of a life by making 
possible a greater amount and variety of meaningful achievements and activities.  I also 
introduce the concepts “cyborg” and “meaningfulness” and argue that the concept of 
meaningfulness is not unintelligible.  I then clarify some important distinctions that are 
commonly made in the field of meaning of life and argue briefly that an objectivist 
naturalist approach is at least substantially plausible.  Lastly I defend the method of 
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appealing to intuition that I use to make claims about meaning.  In Chapter Two I 
distinguish between meaningful achievements and meaningful activities and consider 
which kinds of achievements and activities count as meaningful.  I present a rough 
“theory of meaning” that tries to capture what it is in virtue of which achievements and 
activities are meaningful.  I then use this to suggest how one might go about assessing the 
meaningfulness of particular activities and achievements and argue that the theory entails 
that cybernetic enhancements would provide more meaning in life if used in certain ways.  
Lastly I consider whether the “aggregative view” (according to which increasing the 
amount of meaningful parts of a life can increase the sum total of meaning), which my 
account embraces, is plausible and what kind of role factors such as order of events play 
in the meaningfulness of a life.   
 
The last four chapters all consider possible objections to my thesis.  In Chapter Three I 
consider the objection that enhancements cannot contribute meaning to life because they 
do not allow for the development of virtues and skills, and because they eliminate aspects 
of experience such as effort and suffering.  This includes making the claim that 
eliminating effort and certain internal goods does not result in a great loss of meaning 
since these are only instrumentally meaningful, as well as considering whether effort and 
these internal goods would in fact be eliminated from a person’s life by her becoming 
enhanced.  In Chapter Four I focus on the perception that enhancements are like tools, 
and cyborgs like machines.  I consider the objection that since getting enhanced is akin to 
using tools, the achievements and activity carried out as a result of being enhanced are 
not properly attributable to the cyborg.  According to this objection, enhancements would 
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not increase meaning in a life because a person must be responsible for activities and 
achievements if they are to contribute meaning to her life.  I argue that responsibility is 
not necessary for meaning to accrue to a life in all cases, and that in any case becoming 
enhanced need not compromise one’s responsibility for the activities and achievements 
made possible by enhancements.  Next I consider the objection that enhancements would 
not increase or only slightly increase meaning in a life because they pose a threat to 
identity.  I consider various ways in which it may be thought that our identity could be 
threatened by becoming a cyborg and show that none of these need mean that I should 
give up my thesis.  In Chapter Five I discuss some of the dangers to society that may 
result from people becoming cyborgs, as well as the ethical implications of becoming a 
cyborg and developing cybernetic technology and whether these would prevent activities 
or achievements made possible by enhancements from counting as meaningful.  Lastly, in 
Chapter Six, I consider the claim that cyborgs will not have more meaningful lives by 
acquiring more capabilities because deaf people do not have less meaningful lives by 
excluding certain capabilities.  I argue that while deaf people need not have less 
meaningful lives than hearing people, this does not imply that cyborgs cannot have more 
meaningful lives as a result of getting enhancements.  I conclude that becoming a cyborg 
is one way in which the meaningfulness of one’s life can be increased. 
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Chapter One 
 
Cyborgs and Meaning 
 
Philosophers with widely varying views (for example, both theists and atheists) hold that 
one of the ways in which a life can be meaningful is by including certain activities or 
achievements.   In this report I argue that one of the ways that it is possible for a person 
to be capable of more meaningful achievements and to engage in more meaningful 
activities is to undergo cybernetic enhancement: i.e. to become a cyborg.   
 
“Cyborg” is short for “cybernetic organism”: an entity that is a “synthesis of organic and 
synthetic parts”.1 Cyborgs are organisms with enhanced abilities as a result of implants 
that use synthetic feedback mechanisms2 to connect the brain to mechanical prostheses 
and other artificial additions such as synthetic muscles. The possibilities of cybernetic 
enhancement have been explored at length in science fiction novels such as Blade Runner 
by Philip K. Dick and movies such as Emoflex.  For example, in Emoflex one of the 
characters gets hand prostheses in place of her feet in order to be more agile, which is 
required in her attempts to infiltrate the headquarters of the ruling party that she believes 
is murdering innocents.  However, technological improvements today provide reason to 
believe that these kinds of ideas may shortly be instantiated in the real world.  For 
                                                
1 “Cyborg,” available at < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyborg>. 
2 “Cyborg”. 
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example, Kevin Warwick, British scientist and professor of cybernetics at the University 
of Reading, has succeeded in manipulating a robotic arm in another room by transmitting 
impulses via electrons inserted into his own arm, and translated through a computer to the 
robotic arm.3   
 
Artificial implants have become commonly used in medicine, for example “joint 
replacements, heart valves, plastic blood vessels, insulin pumps, synthetic skin, artificial 
blood, even polymermetal muscles...[and] wires that stimulate optic and auditory 
nerves”4 that have permitted improved eyesight and allowed deaf people to hear 
respectively.  In this paper when I talk of cybernetic enhancement I will not be talking 
about restorative uses of technology, although it might well be argued that these 
interventions can make a life more meaningful, especially ones that involve restoring 
sight or hearing.  In fact if my argument works, it seems to imply that meaning will 
increase in these cases.  I will focus on cybernetic enhancements rather than repair of 
limbs: for example, more strength and coordination in the hand with the help of synthetic 
muscle grafts, extra limbs and maybe even strange attachments like tails or wings.  
Similarly I will consider enhancement and not restoration of organs, for example, 
telescopic or x-ray vision; and the brain, for example, digital implanted memory 
recorders.  Significant improvements in cybernetics suggest that these kinds of 
enhancements will be possible at some point in the future.  However, even if it turns out 
that certain cybernetic enhancements are impossible, it remains revealing for how we 
conceptualize the meaningful life to consider the possibility that they are not.  
                                                
3 W. Underhill, “Merging Man and Machine,” Newsweek 140 (2002): p. 38. 
4 “The Bionic Connection,” Discover 23 (2002): p. 493. 
 
  10 
 
 
 
 
The “Meaningful Life” 
 
The questions, “What is the meaning of life?” or “What counts as a meaningful life?” are 
notoriously difficult to answer.  For one, the terminology is misleading, or at least 
confusing: we tend to think of “meaning” in the context of language, that is, in terms of 
reference, but it is not this sense that the word has in these questions.  One of the ways 
that philosophers in the past have denied that the question of what constitutes or adds 
meaning to life is a legitimate one deserving attention is by arguing that statements about 
life’s meanings are not well-formed propositions.  One reason for believing this is that to 
be “meaningful” is to be a symbol, and life is not something that can be meaningful since 
it is not a symbol.5  However, there is no reason to think that all senses of a word have the 
same properties: for example not all senses of the word “fire” need include the concept of 
heat – as in the case where to fire someone from a job is to terminate their employment.  
Similarly, talk of meaning of life need not include the property of symbolism, especially 
if it is remembered that inter-changeable phrases such as “significant existence” and “life 
that matters” do not include such a property.6   
 
Another reason why the question of what contributes meaning to life does not seem to be 
unintelligible is that most people have fairly strong intuitions about what is and is not 
                                                
5 Thaddeus Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” Ethics 112 (2002): p. 801. 
6 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 801. 
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capable of making a life meaningful.  For example, many feel that the lives of Plato, 
Mandela and Picasso are clearly meaningful, whereas the lives of people who do not do 
anything to help or connect with others and those who dedicate their lives to worthless 
activities are not meaningful, or at least substantially less meaningful than they could be. 
Clearly a person whose life is dedicated to finding the cure for cancer but who does not 
use this discovery to help others, and instead burns all evidence of research on 
completion, will lack meaning for that reason, and the life of someone with no close 
relationships lacks the meaning that lives that do have these kinds of relationships have.  
For an example of the kind of life that is clearly lacking in meaning by being dedicated to 
worthless activity W. D. Joske points to the life of the school master in the novel, The 
Incorruptibles by Guthrie Wilson, which is dedicated to parsing and analysing 
sentences.7  While I will not be considering the question of when a life is meaningful on 
the whole, I will be considering how parts of a life can make it more meaningful.  Almost 
all accounts of the meaningful life take a life to be meaningful because it is made up of 
meaningful parts,8 and my paper will be examining accounts that focus on activity and 
achievement as one major meaningful part. 
 
In this paper I am more concerned with the question, “What counts as a meaningful 
life?”, than the question, “What is the meaning of life?”  I take the latter to ask whether 
human life as a species has a meaning, or greater purpose, while the former asks merely 
whether, and as a result of which features, individual human lives can be meaningful.  
This distinction is important, and I will be assuming, with others, that individual lives can 
                                                
7 W. D. Joske, “Philosophy and the Meaning of Life,” in E. D. Klemke, ed., The Meaning of Life, second 
edition (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000), p. 287. 
8 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 783. 
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be meaningful even if human life as a whole has no meaning.9  Thus I will not address 
the question of the meaningfulness of the human race or the universe as a whole at all. 
 
If we take meaningfulness to be an unanalyzable quality (such as tasting salty),10 then 
discussion of meaning becomes difficult.  This is because it is not clear whether this 
unanalyzable quality is perceivable, and, if it is, then the question arises of who can be 
trusted to have detected it.  It is difficult to imagine what an appropriate “meaning 
locater” would be like, and without one it becomes very difficult to resolve disputes on 
which lives lack or contain meaning.  However, it does seem possible for meaningfulness 
to be understood in terms of other concepts that we are more familiar with.  When we say 
that an individual life is “meaningful” we seem to be saying that such a life includes 
certain features or patterns that are particularly worth admiration and connect with what 
is exceptionally valuable.  Extraordinary scientific discoveries, philanthropic work and 
artistic endeavours are generally considered meaningful and are all examples (among 
others) of what we particularly admire.   
 
A common understanding of the content of the notion of a “meaningful life” is that the 
term is applicable to those who have striven for and achieved the proper kinds of goals- 
i.e. meaning in life comes from achieving certain purposes.  However, it is not possible to 
reduce talk of meaning to talk of purposes since, as Thaddeus Metz notes, such a theory 
implausibly excludes as theories of meaning the views that argue that meaning can be 
                                                
9 Thaddeus Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” Philosophy Compass 2 (2007): p. 211. 
10 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 803. 
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imparted by external, uncontrollable factors such as God.11  While the content of 
“meaning” is not essentially captured by talk of purposes, having appropriate purposes 
does seem to be one central way that a life can acquire meaning, and this is a claim 
widely accepted in the literature.   
 
An objectivist naturalist account of meaning as an appealing view 
 
It seems to me that an objectivist and naturalist view fits well with many of our strong 
intuitions about meaning.  I have no space to defend this claim in detail here, and it is not 
necessary for my project that I do, but I will defend it briefly, since the 
objectivist/subjectivist and naturalist/supernaturalist distinctions are important 
distinctions in the field.  
 
On a subjectivist view of meaning, something is meaningful because it is the object of a 
pro-attitude of someone: for example, because it is desired and esteemed by someone.  I 
find this kind of view of meaningfulness (and of value) implausible. A simple reason why 
I think it implausible is that on this view all manner of things that we generally take not 
to be valuable or meaningful would turn out to be valuable or meaningful if they were the 
object of a pro-attitude of someone12, for example rape, or filling, emptying and refilling 
a bottle with water, and this seems absurd.   
 
                                                
11 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 802. 
12 Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” p. 203. 
 
  14 
 
Intuitively most people think that some of the things that contribute meaning to life are 
loving relationships, achievements, actions, and creativity.  Furthermore, it is common to 
think that only certain relationships, actions and achievements and creative endeavours 
add meaning, and people who think this are objectivists about meaning.  For objectivists 
about meaning it is not the case that achieving just anything, as long as it is deemed 
meaningful by the achiever (for example, buying every single packet of popcorn on the 
shelf in the supermarket, for no greater purpose), will add meaning to one’s life.  
Objectivists about meaning think that meaning is not dependent solely on mental states, 
i.e. evaluating something as meaningful and engaging in it as a result is not sufficient to 
contribute meaning to one’s life, even though evaluating something as meaningful may 
contribute some meaning if what is engaged in and evaluated as meaningful really is 
meaningful.  For instance, Susan Wolf argues that meaning in life is constituted by loving 
what is objectively worthy of love (which only includes some projects and conditions), so 
that “If there is nothing [objectively valuable that] we love or are able to love, a 
meaningful life is not open to us”.13  However, it seems to me that one does not 
necessarily need to love a project in order for it to count as a meaningful one (for 
example, the scientist need not love discovering the cure for cancer for it to contribute 
meaning to his life – he may even detest cancer patients and the work that was necessary 
in discovering the cure): that is, one need not recognize the significance of objectively 
meaningful factors in one’s life in order for them to contribute to the meaningfulness of 
one’s life, although in some cases recognition can add some meaning.   
 
                                                
13 Susan Wolf, “The True, the Good, and the Lovable,” in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, eds., Contours of 
Agency – Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (London: The MIT Press: 2002): p. 237. 
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I move on now to supernaturalist/naturalist views on meaning.  Supernaturalists believe 
that a meaningful life is impossible without the existence of some kind of supernatural 
realm towards which an individual relates properly, while naturalists believe that a 
meaningful life is possible in a purely physical world, i.e. in the world that can be known 
with the five senses.  My sympathies lie with a naturalist perspective since I think that 
many clear cases of meaningful lives would not lose their meaning if it turned out that the 
people in question did not possess souls, or that God did not exist.  For example, 
Mahatma Gandhi’s accomplishments seem to me to be no less meaningful if we assume 
that God does not exist, or that Gandhi did not have a soul.   
 
The thought of our efforts, of all our activities and achievements, being forgotten and 
ultimately amounting to nothing serves as a powerful reason for many to think that 
meaning in life is impossible if all that exists is the physical universe.  This explains the 
appeal of a God centred view that holds that God is key to a meaningful life, since an all-
good and all-powerful God would ensure that our experiences and those of our loved 
ones are immortalized in his unified memory,14 and thus avoid the loss of meaning that 
the destruction of the physical world appears to herald.  Similarly, many people think that 
a soul is necessary for meaningfulness because they think that the meaningful life must 
be worth living, and if a life is to be worth living, then it must have more value than is 
possible from a finite life, which can only make a finite difference to the world.15  
However, again there seems to be many examples of lives that are worth living (for 
example those that promote human welfare, or achieve human excellence), even if their 
                                                
14 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 788. 
15 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” pp. 788-789. 
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impact and value is only finite.  Even if Nelson Mandela’s life was finite and even if one 
day all memory of him will be destroyed, it seems nonetheless that he had a meaningful 
and worthwhile life, just because of what he achieved in his lifetime, and because he 
engaged in meaningful activities, such as working for justice and uniting people.   
 
Since subjectivism and supernaturalism are problematic for at least the reasons listed 
above, I will be assuming an objectivist naturalist perspective for the rest of the paper. 
 
Some Important Distinctions 
 
One way of clarifying what it is we are talking about when we talk about the meaningful 
life is to contrast it with other types of lives.  Most philosophers on meaning of life 
consider meaningfulness of life to be “a fundamental normative category that is distinct 
from welfare and morality”,16 so that the meaningful life is particularly worth pursuing 
for reasons other than the pleasure it may bring, and is not the kind of life that one 
analytically has a moral duty to pursue.  I take meaning to be a type of value analytically 
distinct from moral value since meaningful activities or elements need not be morally 
required: for example, composing a beautiful piece of music is intuitively meaningful but 
not (absent a very peculiar situation) morally obligatory. Similarly, meaningful activities 
need not promote a person’s well-being: sometimes meaningful activities exact a heavy 
toll on the body and mind, as was the case of the Polish scientist Marie Curie who at 
                                                
16 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 782. 
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times suffered from depression and eventually died of overexposure to radiation, in the 
process of making discoveries about radioactive substances. 
 
Also on the list of esteemed lives are the worthwhile life and the life that is unreasonable 
to reject.  One way to identify worthwhile lives is that they are those that contain more 
good than bad.17 Metz points out that the worthwhile life is conceptually distinct from the 
meaningful one since the worthwhile life is one that is worth living, that is, that is worth 
choosing, and some meaningless lives might be worth choosing, for example, life in an 
experience machine.18 A meaningful life can similarly be distinguished from a life that is 
unreasonable to reject, because some lives that are unreasonable to reject (at least in light 
of available alternatives) are nonetheless meaningless, and again the experience machine 
example can be used to illustrate the point.  This is because it might be unreasonable to 
reject a life in the experience machine if it made possible for one a large amount of 
pleasure and interesting experiences (even if these were non-veridical), and negligible 
pain.  In fact, intuitive unease about the experience machine seems to be well explained 
by the fact that it precludes meaning, since whatever a person experiences within it does 
not actually occur, and actual occurrence of events appears to be a condition for 
meaningfulness. 
 
Since evaluating meaningfulness of a life is distinct from evaluating the amount of 
pleasure in a life, the meaningful life can be distinguished from the happy, unreasonable 
                                                
17 Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” p. 213 
18 Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” p. 213 
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to reject, and the worthwhile life. Nonetheless, many meaningful lives will in fact be 
happy, worthwhile and unreasonable to reject.   
 
Method 
 
The concept of the meaningful life is one that we seem to have strong intuitions about, 
and the use of intuitions can be useful in certain fields, particularly where value is 
involved.  While a feeling of certainty does not seem to tell us much conclusively, it is 
nonetheless one of the only things we have to go on in attempting to refine what we mean 
when we talk about the meaningful life.  Thus throughout the paper I will be identifying 
common intuitions as well as what appears to be the best explanations for common 
intuitions that many people hold in order to try to make some headway in clarifying the 
notion of the meaningful life.  A similar method is adopted in ethics.  More specifically, I 
will begin with certain intuitions that I believe are widely shared, and then test these with 
the use of imagined case studies.  There may be tension between what we commonly 
think and what we think in relation to specific cases, and when there is I will attempt to 
revise one of the set of intuitions.  Philosophers writing on meaning of life tend to think 
that claims about meaningfulness of life are either true or false, or that it is appropriate to 
act as if they are.19  Absolute confirmation of their truth, as in other areas of philosophy 
such as ethics, is unlikely, but this does not render the project useless.  
 
 
 
                                                
19 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 802. 
 
  19 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Why cyborgs could have more meaningful lives than us 
 
 
I have argued in chapter one that an objectivist naturalist view is at least substantially 
plausible and now, when defending the idea that cyborgs could have more meaningful 
lives than us, I appeal to a premise that would be widely shared among objective 
naturalists, as well as many supernaturalists and subjectivists about meaning.  This 
premise is that achievement and activity are sources of meaning in a life.  For example, 
the achievement of having produced a beautiful work of art and the activity of working to 
alleviate the suffering of those in dire need are generally considered meaningful.  
Aristotle, an objectivist about meaning, famously describes the good life20 as one in 
which a person engages in rational activity21 in accordance with the virtues.   Most theists 
hold that God expects us to do something with that which he endows us if our lives are to 
be meaningful, such as carry out God’s purpose.  Many subjectivists about meaning 
believe that life’s meaning arises in virtue of being absorbed by the activities one engages 
                                                
20 It seems to me that when Aristotle speaks of the good or “happy” life, he is thinking along the lines of 
what we call the “meaningful life” and not the life of pleasure. 
21 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Christopher Rowe, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 
1102a5. 
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in, or that having purposes which one takes steps to realise is essential to meaningfulness, 
or that meaning arises when one achieves that which one believes is significant.22   
 
Cybernetic improvements to human beings are likely to increase the skill and success 
with which they engage in meaningful behaviour and make possible certain meaningful 
behaviour that was previously impossible.  By “meaningful behaviour” I mean to include 
both meaningful activities and meaningful achievements, between which I distinguish 
below.  In other words, cyborgs can engage in greater and more varied amounts23 of 
meaningful behaviour than unenhanced human beings.  It seems, then, that accepting the 
claim that certain activities and achievements are a source of meaning for a life involves 
accepting that cybernetic enhancements can make a life more meaningful.  I will now 
draw some important distinctions between meaningful activities and meaningful 
achievements, and go on to consider which kinds of behaviour count as meaningful.  I 
will argue that what makes a behaviour meaningful is that it develops or expresses what 
is most praiseworthily ‘human’ and that it involves “real” experiences.  Following this I 
will apply my theory of meaning to the questions of whether cybernetic enhancements 
can increase meaning in a life, and how to go about making judgements of the relative 
meaningfulness of various activities and achievements.  Lastly I will argue that one can 
increase the meaning in one’s life by increasing how much meaningful behaviour one 
engages in by means of cybernetic enhancements. 
 
The difference between meaningful activities and meaningful achievements 
                                                
22 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 793. 
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Meaningful achievements and meaningful activities are often intertwined in various 
ways, but meaningful achievements can primarily be defined as meaningful results: that 
is, meaningful effects of actions on the world, while meaningful activities can be defined 
as meaningful actions, or doings.  In most cases it is thought that if an event or effect on 
the world is to contribute meaning to a person’s life, the person in question must be 
responsible for the event or effect, for example if creating an artwork is to contribute 
meaning to S’s life, then S must be responsible for having created it.  In some cases 
meaning can be made possible for a person via the actions of others, and making meaning 
possible for others seems to be one way in which the life of the person responsible 
increases in meaning.  For example if a doctor discovers a cure for the otherwise fatal 
illness one is suffering from, then he makes it possible for one’s life to become more 
meaningful than it would have been if it had ended at that point. That is, though the 
doctor is not responsible for making one’s life more meaningful (as this is up to what 
decisions one makes after being cured), he is responsible for making more meaning at 
least a possibility for one, and this seems to be something that can contribute some 
meaning to his life.   
 
Sometimes meaningful actions are internal rather than external events; that is, events 
which occur within a person (i.e. mental events) and do not necessarily involve physical 
or visible activity.  For example, listening to (certain kinds of) music appears to be a 
meaningful activity that involves internal events.  In order for music listening to be 
meaningful, it must involve intentionality.  It is certainly possible to ignore music or not 
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to focus on it, for example when one is distracted by something else, and in this case the 
meaningful activity of listening to music will not have taken place, even if the music is 
beautiful. We tend to think of beautiful music as “moving”, but it is not possible to be 
moved or touched by music unless one is attentively listening, that is, actively “taking the 
music in” and engaging with it.  Thus meaningful music listening consists in a number of 
actions, although the actions in this case are internal, i.e. mental. 
 
In some cases the meaningfulness of an activity is obtained from the results of the 
activity, for example in the case where a person (perhaps in a war situation) rows a boat 
in order to get innocent victims to safety.  Rowing a boat is not normally what we 
consider to be a meaningful activity, but because of the meaningful end towards which 
this activity is directed, such an activity acquires meaningfulness. It seems to me that any 
activity with meaningful results will count as meaningful because the achievement 
confers meaning on the activity that brought it about.  Furthermore, any activity that one 
engages in while attempting to achieve the right kinds of achievements (i.e. meaningful 
ones), will count as meaningful as long as the activity one engages in is relatively likely 
to bring about the achievement in question.  For example, riding an elephant in an 
uninhabited desert with intentions of curing a disease will not count as meaningful 
activity since this cannot reasonably be expected to bring about the intended 
achievement.  Reading books about diseases is an activity better suited to this end, but 
getting a degree and doing relevant experiments are more likely to bring about the 
achievement, and are thus likely to be more meaningful activities than reading about 
diseases.   
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However meaningful activities do not necessarily acquire their meaningfulness from the 
results of the activity.  In some cases activities obtain their meaningfulness from the fact 
that a person is in some way engaged with certain valuable objects, for example, the 
activity of listening to music appears to acquire its meaningfulness from the fact that a 
person is engaging with a valuable object, namely beautiful music.  It would be strange to 
consider “listening to music” as an achievement, since it is a process (or a series of 
actions), not a single outcome.  John Cottingham argues that activities must be 
achievement-oriented if they are to confer meaning on a life24 but the example of music 
clearly shows that they need not be, even if in many cases some achievement-orientation 
is identifiable (in some cases the achievement being aimed at is only an abstract and 
ostensibly unattainable one such as “Eradicate disease”, or “End third world debt”).  In 
the case of music there is no goal that one aims to achieve, and in fact goal-orientation 
(such as “memorise this music” or “enjoy this music”) may even be thought (at least in 
some cases) to detract from the meaningfulness of this activity.  Is it possible that we 
have some kind of vaguer goal in mind, such as to understand what the musician is trying 
to communicate, or to feel some kind of emotion (perhaps the emotion that is being 
expressed by the song)? This seems implausible since not all musicians aim to 
communicate anything (at least in the sense of clear propositions) with their music, and 
not all music is designed to elicit emotion.  Could the relevant achievement-orientation of 
meaningful music listening then be “to have engaged with the music”?  This also seems 
implausible, since we do not consciously approach music thinking “I will now aim, by 
                                                
24 John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (New York: Routledge, 2003): p. 21. 
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the end of listening, to have engaged with this piece of music”, and one does not think 
with pride afterwards “I have achieved something”.  A listening experience would 
probably not be meaningful without intention to engage with the music, and 
concentration on the music, but concentrating and engaging are not goals: they are 
activities.  It seems to me that a meaningful listening experience first and foremost 
involves engaging with valuable music, not striving for anything.  However, in many 
cases activities acquire their meaningfulness from the fact that a person is in the process 
of attempting to achieve something, even if she never actually achieves it, for example, 
striving to reduce environmental damage through publishing information on how to save 
electricity appears to be a meaningful activity, even if this aim is not achieved.   
 
It seems that meaningful achievements are always preceded by meaningful activity, 
because the achievement confers meaning on the activity that brought it about, as in the 
above case of rowing the boat.  However, meaningful achievements need not be preceded 
by large amounts of meaningful activity, for example, in the case of a child genius who 
composes a beautiful piece of music.  The composition surely still counts as a meaningful 
achievement, even if it was not preceded by large amounts of relevant meaningful 
activity (i.e. composing).  One might think that there are meaningful achievements that 
are spontaneously brought about (i.e. that are not preceded by meaningful activity), such 
as when a person sacrifices his life for the sake of many in a situation where he is given a 
few seconds to make the choice.  The result brought about, i.e. the safety of many people 
who would have otherwise been injured or killed, is meaningful.  However, even though 
the sacrifice was quick, it seems that it still counts as a meaningful activity, since it 
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involves a series of actions (even if these include very few actions, some of these being 
mental events: for example, deciding to save the people and pushing a button).  The 
meaningfulness of the sacrifice seems to be acquired both from the intention and attempt 
to save the people, as well as from the achievement of actually saving them.   
 
If it is true that any activities that are intended to bring about, and are relatively likely to 
bring about, the right kinds of achievements are meaningful and any activity with 
meaningful results will count as meaningful (even if it does not usually – that is, in other 
contexts - count as meaningful), does this mean that meaningful activities count less 
meaning-wise than meaningful achievements?  Or, is there some kind of dependence of 
meaningful activity on meaningful achievement?   
 
In some cases it seems that the meaning of an achievement would be enhanced if an 
achievement were preceded by a large amount of meaningful activity.  This suggests that 
there are cases in which it is the activity that confers meaning on the achievement, and 
not only the achievement that confers meaning on activity.  For example, if someone with 
a debilitating illness was nonetheless able to get a degree as a result of consistently trying 
to learn as much as possible, we tend to think this is a more meaningful achievement than 
someone who did so by doing hardly any work. However, the lesser amount of 
meaningful activity beforehand does not rob the second student’s achievement of all its 
meaning, and while more meaningful activity may in some cases enhance meaning, this 
point alone does not provide reason to think that achievements do not count for more 
meaning-wise than activities. 
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Another reason one might think that achievements are more meaningful than activities is 
that it is widely thought that a degree of success25 is necessary for activities to be 
meaningful, for example, someone who succeeds in finding a cure for a terrible disease 
might naturally be thought of as having acted meaningfully while someone who only 
tried, and failed, would not.  Furthermore some think that if a meaningful activity that is 
directed towards a certain end does not succeed, the activity is rendered meaningless.  For 
example, Cottingham describes a case where someone makes a large amount of sacrifices 
to build a hospital that is destroyed, along with the lives of many people, by a meteorite.26  
Although there is clearly some loss in meaning here, it is less clear to me that the life of 
the person responsible acquires no meaning from such activity, especially given his 
intentions and the fact that the activity he engaged in was likely to bring about the results 
he desired.  While I have already provided examples of meaningful activity that need not 
achieve anything in order to be meaningful such as listening to music, there is another 
reason to think that this hierarchy is mistaken, at least as a general rule.  It seems that 
some activities are not only in their nature meaningful independently of any results they 
achieve, but also can in some cases be more meaningful than certain achievements even 
if they fail to have good consequences.  For example, imagine a nun, Mother Francis, 
who devotes all her time and energy to helping the poor, sick and miserable.  
Unbeknownst to her, an evil man, Voldermortor tracks down every person she helps and 
murders them.  Intuitively it seems that Voldermortor does not undermine all of the 
meaningfulness of Francis’s work, even if he prevents it from becoming an achievement 
                                                
25 Berit Brogaard and Barry Smith, “On Luck, Responsibility and the Meaning of Life,” Philosophical 
Papers 34 (2005): p. 454. 
26 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 66. 
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(at least, he prevents Francis from achieving a state affairs where a certain percentage of 
people who were previously poor, miserable and sick are now healthy, which is 
presumably where Mother Francis is aiming), and Mother Francis’s activity seems to me 
to be more meaningful than the achievement of winning the Comrades Marathon.  It 
seems then that we cannot assume that achievements are in their nature more meaningful 
than activities.  Rather, certain achievements are more meaningful than certain activities, 
as in the finding cures versus trying to find cures case, and certain activities are more 
meaningful than certain achievements, as in the helping the poor, miserable and sick 
versus the comrades marathon case.  
 
There are some qualities that we would expect both meaningful activities and meaningful 
achievements to have.  For one, Cottingham argues that activities cannot be trivial or silly 
if they are to be meaningful.27  This seems plausible, especially since other terms we 
associate with meaningfulness are “importance” and “significance”.  Berit Brogaard and 
Barry Smith also think that a meaningful activity cannot be of a trivial type, and add that 
a person must also freely desire, choose, plan and aim to engage in a behaviour if it is to 
add meaning to her life.28   It seems to me that meaningful achievements may be made 
more meaningful if a person intends to achieve such a result, for example a person who 
aimed to cure and succeeded in curing cancer may have a more meaningful life than one 
who did so accidentally, but intention does not appear to be a necessary condition, given 
the results that certain very meaningful achievements (such as discovering cures) produce 
in the world.  Furthermore, choice, and particularly planning or desiring, like intention, 
                                                
27 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 21. 
28 Metz, “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” p. 207. 
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do not appear to be necessary for meaning, but they do tend to enhance it.  Even if a 
person were locked up and forced to compose music it seems that, if this music turned 
out to be beautiful, it would still add meaning to a life. Cottingham argues that the person 
“who is in the grip of psychological distortions or projections, and whose goals are 
therefore not transparent, risks an erosion of their status as an autonomous agent engaged 
in meaningful activities”,29 but it seems to me that even the person who is deluded will 
add some meaning to her life by engaging in particularly meaningful behaviour, as will 
the person who does so by accident.  Furthermore, in some cases producing experience 
unconsciously seems to be one source of meaning in a life: for example, one might want 
to attribute some meaning (even if not a lot) to the life of someone in a coma, if she 
happened to be very beautiful and people who saw her were moved by her beauty.  
However, it does seem that if the person is not fully responsible for the behaviour, the 
behaviour will not contribute as much meaning as it would under conditions of awareness 
and intention. 
 
I will now discuss which types of activities and achievements count as meaningful, and 
then how we are to identify what kinds of behaviour counts as meaningful. 
 
In virtue of what is behaviour meaningful? 
 
It would be useful to know whether there are any substantive principles or features that 
characterise meaningful behaviour, or in virtue of which meaningful behaviour is 
generally meaningful.  A suggestion that has prima facie appeal is that meaningful 
                                                
29 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 22. 
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behaviour is generally behaviour that develops or expresses what is most admirably 
‘human’ about us; i.e. what is most praiseworthy and valuable about the human being, 
and this is the view that I will in fact defend.  Prima facie candidates for what is most 
admirably human about us are the capacity for reflective activity, a view espoused by 
Aristotle “since intelligence… is highest of the things in us”,30 the capacity for 
autonomous rational choice and morality (or the “good will”)31, as argued by Immanuel 
Kant, the capacity for love32 as argued by Susan Wolf, and the capacity for creativity33, as 
argued by Richard Taylor.  All these capacities seem to have in common a general 
capacity for both certain emotions (for example empathy and love) and rational thought, 
and these are characteristically human capacities.  Thomas Hurka describes rationality as 
the capacity to “form and act on beliefs and intentions”34 where these are 
“sophisticated…[and have] contents that stretch across persons and times and that are 
arranged in complex hierarchies”35 as well as the ability to “achieve explanatory 
understanding …[by grasping] generalisations that apply across objects and times”36 and 
to “envisage patterns of action that stretch through time or involve other agents…[and] 
intelligent tool use”.37  The type of emotions that are relevant here are those that are 
associated with love, such as empathy. 
 
According to such a view saving people, helping to eliminate poverty and discovering 
cures for diseases count as meaningful behaviour since helping others involves exercising 
                                                
30 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1177a21. 
31 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis White Beck trans. (Indianapolis: 
Library of Liberal Arts, 1959): p. 393. 
32 Wolf, “The True, the Good, and the Lovable,” p. 237. 
33 Richard Taylor, “The Meaning of Life,” available at 
<http://www.philosophynow.org/archive/articles/24taylor.htm>. 
34 Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): p. 39. 
35 Hurka, Perfectionism, p 39. 
36 Hurka, Perfectionism, p. 39. 
37 Hurka, Perfectionism, p. 39. 
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one’s capacity for moral goodness, and moral awareness seems to be dependent on 
rationality, and in some cases empathy (and thus the capacity for the right kind of 
emotion).  Scientific discoveries and ground-breaking philosophical papers count as 
meaningful behaviour since they involve pursuit of truth and understanding (and thus 
rational thought) and creating art exhibits our capacity for creativity (which also involves 
intellectual capacity, and in some cases empathy).   Nurturing our relationships through 
doing things like looking after those we care about when they are sick or showing our 
support by taking an interest in the interests of those we love (for example, watching a 
concert in which one’s sister is singing) count as meaningful activities because they 
exhibit our capacity for love (a particularly significant emotion).  Meaningful behaviour 
need not only develop rationality and our capacity for love in oneself, it can also develop 
it in others, for example, teaching a course on logic is meaningful since it helps to 
develop the rational capacities of others.  Many specific instances of meaningful 
behaviour contribute to particularly admirable projects of the wider human community, 
such as the accumulation of knowledge, artistic excellence and creation of beauty, peace 
and human solidarity, all of which require and involve our capacities for either or both 
rational thought and certain emotion.  
 
However, what is meaningful is not merely what is distinctive about human beings. 
Although many philosophers point out that rationality is a feature peculiar to human 
beings, we could imagine that opposable thumbs were too, but this would not lead us to 
think that opposable thumbs in themselves would contribute any meaning to life.  Thus it 
appears that being a feature unique to human beings is not sufficient to ground 
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meaningfulness.  It is rather the case that what is most admirably or valuably human 
seems to be what we consider to be meaningful and what we would consider meaningful, 
and this is true whether or not only human beings have these features or not.  Oswald 
Hanfling points out that we would still highly regard the intellect were we to discover 
other creatures (for example, aliens) that could reason, so that it is not uniqueness to 
human beings that makes the intellect significant.38  What we most admire about human 
beings would not change were dolphins suddenly to evolve rationality39 by developing 
advanced brains that made them capable of art and understanding: in this case we might 
consider dolphins to live meaningful lives rather than reassess the behaviour as 
meaningless now that it is no longer unique to human beings.  Similarly, if human beings, 
perhaps as an unforeseen result of being exposed to radiation from cell phones, were to 
suddenly lose their ability to understand things, we would consider their lives to have 
collectively become less meaningful rather than consider understanding to have become 
something that no longer counts as a meaning-contributing factor.   
 
However perhaps this way of understanding “human” as tied to what features human 
beings as a species actually have is too strict: perhaps we need to understand “human” in 
a looser sense as a collection of features that many human beings (as understood as 
belonging to the species homo sapiens) have, but not all (for example severely mentally 
handicapped people), and that non-human beings might have (for example aliens and 
androids).  If this is the case then if dolphins were to evolve, we might say they are 
becoming more “human”, in the looser sense, and if human beings were to degenerate 
                                                
38 Oswald Hanfling, The Quest for Meaning (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987): p. 131. 
39 Hurka, Perfectionism, p. 11. 
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from cell phone damage, then we might say they are becoming less “human”, as they 
have lost one of the features that make up a “human” being, as opposed to a human 
being.  Thus meaningful behaviour is behaviour that expresses or develops what is most 
valuably “human”: a group of capabilities that some who belong to the species homo 
sapiens have, that some that do not belong to the species (or are not even alive in the 
usual understanding of the word) such as androids might conceivably come to have, and 
that creatures like bats, bugs and octopuses and plants like cacti, trees and grass do not 
have.  One might admire the capacity of spiders to make webs, the capacity of cheetahs to 
run fast and lions to roar so loud.  However, such capacities are not what we consider 
particularly valuable about “humans”, and as such are not among those capacities that 
add meaning. Particularly valuable features are not valuable for what they bring about. 
Neither are they valuable because they are rare - a universe that is teeming with 
creativity, understanding and love, is one in which there is more meaning, not less.  
Rather, they are valuable in themselves, and rationality and love appear to be these kinds 
of features.  
 
Cottingham holds a similar view to mine.  According to Cottingham, “A meaningful 
life…must involve worthwhile activities or projects that enable us to flourish as human 
beings.  Such flourishing requires the development of our human capacities for feeling 
and reason: it involves cultivating the faculties that allow sympathetic emotional 
interaction and open rational dialogue with our fellow humans.”40  Cottingham’s view 
differs from mine by including an extra element that he thinks is required for meaning in 
                                                
40 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 64. 
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life.  Like me, he argues a life cannot simply be meaningful in virtue of “being directed 
towards the flowering of our human nature”41, if this is to be understood as “a collection 
of contingent facts about the sort of creatures we humans have evolved to be”42; rather it 
must be directed towards what is “noblest and best about us”.43  However, Cottingham 
argues that human beings need a religious perspective that allows them to have hope that 
in the end good will prevail, because without this confidence in the good the motivation 
to pursue the good (or to be specific, the meaningful) will be lacking, given how fragile 
the good (or the meaningful) appears to be if this is the only world that exists.44  Belief in 
the existence of God, according to Cottingham, renders what would otherwise simply be 
“a set of characteristics that a certain species happens intermittently to possess”,45 
something we can intelligibly view as worth pursuing since we believe it is desired by an 
infinitely good being who created us, that we achieve it.  If we believe God exists, then 
we can believe that our struggles to pursue the good contribute “to the establishment of a 
moral order that the cosmos was created to realise”,46 rather than being the outcome of 
contingent events or blind forces.   
 
However, it seems clear to me that not everyone needs such views in order to be 
committed to the good, or to attempt meaningful behaviour.  For many atheists the strong 
conviction that certain things are particularly valuable is motivation enough to engage in 
meaningful behaviour.  A religious perspective does not seem to be a requirement for 
                                                
41 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 71. 
42 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 71 
43 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 71. 
44 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 72. 
45 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 72. 
46 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 72. 
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having a meaningful life and meaningful behaviour certainly does not seem to be even 
partly constituted by a person’s having a religious view since there are many people who 
are atheists who we consider to have led meaningful lives, for example, Jean-Paul Sartre.  
 
Thomas Hurka’s view is also similar to mine – specifically in that he identifies rationality 
as a particularly worthwhile feature to develop.  Hurka, in developing a theory of moral 
perfectionism, seeks to provide a definition of human nature since according to 
perfectionism the morally good life develops “properties… [that] constitute human nature 
or are definitive of humanity – they make humans humans”.47  The properties that make 
up human nature, according to Hurka, are ones that are essential to humans: if something 
is to count as a human, it must have those properties.48  Hurka chooses the properties on 
the basis that they are “central to the truest, simplest, and most predictively powerful 
explanations of humans’ other properties”49 and because they pass the test of thought 
experiments.50  One of these properties is that we are embodied living things.  Hurka 
argues that because of this one of the perfections that we should aim at (besides practical 
and theoretical rationality) is “highest physical perfection”51 and this involves health and 
vigorous bodily activity, best seen in excellent athletes. He writes that “when a human 
runs 100 metres in 9.86 seconds or long-jumps 29 feet, something physically splendid 
occurs.  His bodily powers are realized to the full in a way that is intrinsically admirable 
and of intrinsic perfectionist worth”.52  According to Hurka “robustness…makes the life 
                                                
47 Hurka, Perfectionism: p. 3. 
48 Hurka, Perfectionism: p. 11. 
49 Hurka, Perfectionism: p. 19 
50 Hurka, Perfectionism: p. 34. 
51 Hurka, Perfectionism: p. 39. 
52 Hurka, Perfectionism: p. 39. 
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more fully human”53 so that development of our physical nature is not only 
instrumentally valuable (since it helps us to stay alert and thus helps us to exercise 
rationality) but also intrinsically valuable.54   
 
By saying that what constitutes meaningful behaviour is that it develops or expresses 
what is most valuably human about us where the latter is understood as including the 
capacity for rationality and certain emotions, I have left out physical capacities.  It is not 
clear to me that our physical abilities are one of the features that are most admirable 
about us, or that they are one of the abilities most worthy of development.  However, it 
does seem to be an intuition shared by many that achievements such as winning the 
comrades marathon are meaningful, and this suggests that developing our physical nature 
is meaningful.  However, it still seems to me that if we include this in the theory of 
meaning, it must play a lesser role than the other capacities because as I have mentioned 
before, I think that such activities count less meaning-wise than do the capacities for 
rationality and certain emotions.  One reason for this is that many of our physical abilities 
when compared with animals are quite feeble: we don’t jump particularly high or run 
particularly fast, or have particularly impressive strength compared with other animal 
species, and if our physical abilities were to be particularly valuable it seems to me that 
they should fare better when compared with other animals.  
 
One of the problems someone might have with my theory of meaning is that it may seem 
too demanding.  It might seem to rule out as meaningful55 lives in which people highly 
                                                
53 Hurka, Perfectionism: p 38. 
54 Hurka, Perfectionism: p. 39. 
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develop a skill such as table tennis or tenpin bowling, since playing table tennis and 
tenpin bowling are not what is most valuable or esteemed about being human.  I am 
willing to allow that such behaviour might contribute some meaning to a life, but when 
comparing these behaviours to other behaviours such as discovering cures for terrible 
diseases, they pale in comparison. Getting very good at table tennis might be admirable in 
the sense of the coordination and determination it displays, as well as a pleasurable and 
worthwhile56 way to spend one’s time, but nonetheless it does not strike me as 
particularly meaningful.  That is, it is just not valuable (or admirable) enough a 
behaviour to count as a very meaningful one, even if it is valuable in other ways that 
make it worth doing.   
 
Someone might object to my identifying meaningful behaviour as behaviour that 
develops or expresses what is most admirably ‘human’ (in the sense I have specified) 
about us by saying that I include as meaningful some lives that in fact do not seem to be 
meaningful.  For example, on this definition androids (robots with artificial intelligence) 
could count as having meaningful lives.  I think that this is just a bullet that needs to be 
bitten.  If there really are androids capable of creating art or gaining understanding or 
helping others, then I think that at least some meaning must attach to their lives.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
55 Here I mean “meaningful on the whole”.  As I have noted in Chapter One, I will not be considering this 
issue in my paper.  However, on my view table tennis and ten pin bowling may not contribute enough 
meaning to render “meaningful on the whole” the lives of those who dedicate their lives to these activities, 
and this is a conclusion that some might not want to accept.  While I think that such a conclusion might 
well follow from my theory of meaning, it does not seem to me to be an intuitively implausible one. 
56 Here “worthwhile” is meant to be understood as I have used the term in Chapter One and not as being 
equivalent to “meaningful”. 
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My account may also seem objectionable on grounds that it assumes that the 
circumstances one is faced with can make a substantial difference to meaning, and some 
may feel that everyone is capable of an equal amount of meaning depending on their 
using their potential to the best of their abilities given the circumstances.  For example, 
consider a person who is confined to concentration camps for long periods but chooses to 
live with as much dignity and optimism and courage as possible.  Such a person does not 
live a meaningless existence on my account, since he is responding in a way that is 
admirably human to what life has thrown his way.  However, relative to human beings 
who are not imprisoned and prohibited from all sorts of activities such a person will 
probably not have a very meaningful life and it seems to me that part of the reason why 
we would very much like to avoid such situations is because they have so little 
opportunity for meaning.  Thus the circumstances and the possibilities for meaning that 
they produce play a large role in how meaningful a life is on my account – larger than 
some would like to think.  Cottingham notes that the frailty of human life would seem to 
suggest that my kind of view would rule out as meaningful those lives that fail as a result 
of “birth, or upbringing, or ill-health, or lack of resources, or accident”57 to include 
meaningful elements and he finds this kind of view morally offensive as it denies that 
each human being has a dignity which confers on him infinite value.58  However, I do not 
see why we cannot maintain that human beings have a dignity but also accept that the 
meaningfulness of their lives varies considerably according to luck.  Morally speaking 
human beings deserve respectful treatment and are equally valuable even if in terms of 
                                                
57 Cottingham, On the meaning of Life, p. 69. 
58 Cottingham, On the meaning of Life, p. 92. 
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meaning their lives vary, but this is not problematic since meaning and morality are 
different categories of value.59   
 
Thus it seems to me that behaviour is meaningful in virtue of expressing or developing 
what is most admirably human about us.  However, behaviour also involves experiences 
of certain types, and I will argue briefly in the next section that the experiences of 
engaging in meaningful activities or bringing about meaningful achievements must be 
“real”: i.e. they must causally interact with the “real” world and not be simulated.  
 
Real experience as part of what constitutes meaning 
 
Robert Audi identifies meaningful projects as those that are constituted by rewarding 
experiences either in one’s own life or that one manages to produce in the lives of others.  
Rewarding experiences are those in which one’s rational capacities are engaged in 
sophisticated and diverse ways”.60  Metz objects that Audi’s account is problematic 
because it implies that a person could have a meaningful life in an experience machine, 
since it chiefly involves pleasant experience, which he argues is more relevant to 
happiness than the meaningful life.61  The other problematic thing about experience as a 
candidate for a constitutive condition for meaning is that experience need not be caused 
by real things in the world, or be accompanied by actual effects in the world.  The 
                                                
59 I will argue in Chapter Five that acting in morally bad ways can negatively affect the amount of meaning 
in one’s life. 
60 Robert Audi, “Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life,” Philosophical Papers 34 (2005): pp. 331-355. 
61 Metz., “New Developments in the Meaning of Life,” p. 208. 
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experience machine provides experience and merely simulates action, and intuitively it 
seems that simulated action is not sufficient to provide meaning.   
 
Audi recognises that “hallucinatory experience…differ[s] from its veridical 
counterpart”62 so that there is more inherent value in the veridical experience because 
objects in the real world can be valuable in themselves (even if this goodness is not 
“basic”, since it exists in virtue of being capable of producing rewarding experiences, 
which are basically good, according to Audi).63  It appears that Audi wants to say that 
experiences are more meaningful if they occur in the real world, but not that they are 
completely meaningless if they occur in the experience machine.  However it seems to 
me that experiences that occur in the experience machine are meaningless.  This is 
because meaning appears to me to concern one’s interaction with things or states of 
affairs that really exist.  Though the object of interaction ranges from people to valuable 
objects, if these things do not exist, then interaction with them seems to be meaningless.  
It is this intuition that explains the horror a person imagines she would feel if she were to 
discover that everything she had experienced up to now was simulated: the horror, in my 
opinion, would mostly result from the realisation that her life is meaningless.  It appears 
to me that even the desire not to be deceived does not explain as well why most people 
cringe at the idea of entering the experience machine, as does fear of meaninglessness.  
 
Thus real experiences (i.e. experiences that are properly causally connected with the 
world), whether experienced or produced in others, are necessary for meaningful 
                                                
62 Audi, “Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life,” p. 340. 
63 Audi, “Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life,” p. 340. 
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behaviour: that is, meaningfulness requires not only that we develop or express our 
human capacities for rationality and certain emotion, but also that the conditions under 
which we do this are real, not just simulated.  For example, behaviour that takes place in 
virtual reality is not “real” experience since it does not link up with and reflect the “real” 
world – only a computer generated one.   
 
 
 
 
My theory of meaning applied to the questions of whether cybernetic enhancements can 
increase meaning in a life, and how to go about making judgements of the relative 
meaningfulness of various activities and achievements. 
 
On my theory of meaning becoming enhanced is prima facie one way in which one could 
increase meaning in one’s life since enhancements appear to make possible more rational 
activity.  One reason for this is that enhancements would decrease the amount of time 
spent on repetitive, mind-numbing tasks that require negligible intelligence so that more 
time can be spent on tasks that are more challenging, such as reading philosophy.   
Cybernetic enhancements could remove or decrease the amount of other obstacles to 
engaging in more rational activity, for example, by increasing one’s memory, or even 
increasing one’s general knowledge as a result of implanted chips, since often forgetting 
something important or not knowing a term’s definition can limit how deeply one can 
think about information at hand.   
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Furthermore enhancements could make possible deeper care for other human beings and 
thus develop the cyborg’s capacity for love or empathy.  This is because acting in the 
interests of someone (for example, helping them) tends to develop emotional ties between 
one and the person one helps, or at least develops one’s concern for the person one helps, 
especially if the helping occurs over a length of time.  Since enhancements will in many 
cases make possible more opportunities for helping others (since enhancements in many 
cases will provide one with increased strength or abilities that are necessary for helping 
people in certain situations), cyborgs are more likely to actually help people. This is the 
case especially if a person is required to undergo tests that assess her commitment to the 
good64 before she is allowed to get enhanced, assuming that the kind of people who pass 
these tests and thereafter get enhancements will be the kind of people who try to help 
people in general.  If helping people develops one’s concern for them, or “fellow feeling” 
and this can increase meaning in a life, then enhancements can increase meaning in one’s 
life in this way.   
 
Cybernetic enhancement could also make possible more meaningful behaviour in which 
rational activity and certain emotions play important roles. For example, with the help of 
an artificial skin a person who is naturally born with great susceptibility to skin disease 
could thereafter offer comfort to those suffering from leprosy without hesitation.  If she 
were also to get artificial wing prostheses, her travels between lepers could be made more 
comfortable and speedy, by taking strain off her legs.  In the case of the scientist, 
                                                
64 I will argue in Chapter Five that there is good reason for these types of tests to be administered. 
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artificial muscles in his legs and back could help him to fight fatigue, and an artificial 
memory device could help him to retain information that might be relevant to finding 
cures.  Enhancements could increase the amount and types of achievements and activities 
that a person is capable of and could also make possible almost immediate achievements 
that do not require previously engaging in large amounts of meaningful activity in order 
to be meaningful: for example, someone who would normally spend her time chiefly on 
composing music could, with the help of wing prostheses be a life-guard rescuing 
drowning people on weekends, and compose more by cutting out time spent in traffic.  
This way she is capable of both more meaningful activities (composing, trying to prevent 
loss of life) as well meaningful achievements (contributing new music to the world and 
saving lives).  
 
The amount of meaning that an activity or achievement “counts for” depends on how 
much it develops or expresses our particularly admirable human capacities.  Some 
behaviours express or develop our human capacities to a great extent while others do so 
to a far lesser degree.  The former increase meaning substantially and the latter only 
enhance meaning in a life to some extent.  The amount by which an element decreases 
meaning in a life depends on the extent to which it prevents one or others from 
expressing or developing their human capacities.  For example, murder (in most cases) 
would seriously decrease the amount of meaning in the life of the murderer since by 
murdering his victim he deprives her of her ability to exercise any of her human 
capacities and since he displays a serious lack of fellow-feeling.  However, writing a 
particularly brilliant philosophy book or starting a home for orphans and spending the 
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bulk of one’s time caring for them are substantial meaning contributors as both activities 
demand extensive exercise and development of our capacities for reason and love 
respectively. 
 
There are clear cases where increasing the amount of meaningful behaviour one engages 
in increases the meaningfulness of a life relative to its including less meaningful 
behaviour.  For example, finding a cure for two terrible diseases seems to add more 
meaning to a life than finding only one, and finding ten seems to add even more meaning 
than finding two.  As an example of a meaningful activity (as opposed to an achievement) 
where this is the case, consider Mother Teresa who spent her time helping the poor for 
many years.  She sacrificed other activities (for example rearing her own children) in 
order to pursue this one, and it seems to me that at least part of the reason why we think 
that she had such a meaningful life, apart from the fact that she engaged in meaningful 
activity, is that she engaged in so much meaningful activity.   
 
If someone is to accept my claim that cybernetic enhancements can make a life more 
meaningful, he needs to accept the claim that by increasing the amount of meaningful 
behaviour one engages in, one can increase the meaning in one’s life.  It is objections to 
this claim that I will consider in the next section. 
 
Why would someone think that engaging in behaviour of a certain kind does not lead to a 
more meaningful life? 
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In this paper I am focusing on only one part of the meaningful life, but some have argued 
that theories that focus on individual elements in a life that can be bearers of meaning are 
misguided in the sense that they reduce a life to what Johan Brännmark describes as a 
“container” 65 of meaning.  According to this aggregative view of meaning, meaning can 
be increased or decreased much as the amount of water in a bucket can be increased or 
decreased, and more meaning, quantitatively speaking, is preferable to less, and is a 
worthy aim to pursue.  According to this view certain factors, such as meaningful 
activities, certain types of relationships and effort increase meaningfulness while others, 
such as cruelty and laziness, decrease, or fail to increase meaningfulness.  That is, the 
ingredients of a life determine its meaning-quotient so that a life can be more or less 
meaningful depending on its ingredients, and the amounts of these. 
 
A serious problem for the aggregative view is the possibility that life considered as a 
whole is the sole bearer of meaning; that is, no parts of a life are meaningful in 
themselves. According to this view the order and specific interrelation of events is 
fundamental to their meaningfulness.  This view denies that there are some elements that 
contribute meaning, no matter where they are situated in our lives. 
 
According to Johan Brännmark, if one is to make a final judgement of a life, one cannot 
only make judgements about separate parts of life.  Brännmark draws an analogy between 
lives and novels: in evaluating a novel we make an overall judgement about its quality, 
but we don’t “[dream] of having an algorithm in which we could simply feed the quality 
                                                
65 Johan Brännmark, “Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” Philosophical Papers 32 
(2003): p. 330. 
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of its parts and get its overall quality without having to perform some final substantive 
act of judgement about the work as a whole”66, even if we can see how parts of the novel 
contribute to making it better or worse.  Brännmark argues that in evaluating the parts of 
a book and how they contribute to its goodness, the most we can say is how important 
they are in making the book good, but not that they have specific values.  Jerrold 
Levinson argues for the same kind of point as Brännmark, but in a different way, namely 
by saying that only “lives being certain ways”67 are appropriate candidates for the 
description “intrinsically valuable”, since anything less than this is intrinsically valuable 
only given the addition of relations to other things and certain states of affairs being 
present.  For example, while joy appears to be a fair candidate for intrinsic value, we 
hesitate to say that it is intrinsically valuable in a case where a person has just murdered a 
bus full of people.  Rather, that joy must be appropriate given the circumstances and the 
other events in a person’s life.  Since all candidates for intrinsic value turn out to need 
qualification such as this, Levinson argues that we must accept that “slices of life” are 
what are intrinsically valuable, not types of experience, such as joy.68  
 
If Brännmark and Levinson are right, then simply increasing certain elements in a life, 
such as meaningful activities and achievements, will not add meaning to a life if they do 
not occur in the right order or in relation to the right circumstances and other experiences.  
Applied to my argument, whether an enhancement will increase meaning will depend 
                                                
66 Brännmark, “Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning.” p.324. 
67 Jerrold Levinson, “Intrinsic Value and the Notion of a Life,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 
(2004): p. 319. 
68 Levinson, “Intrinsic Value and the Notion of a Life,” pp. 319–29. 
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heavily on when it is used, and the meaningfulness of an enhancement will be just about 
impossible to estimate independently of information about specific events in a life.   
 
However, I think that Brännmark and Levinson are mistaken in denying that elements in 
a life can have a specific fixed value, no matter where they are situated and that the value 
of elements varies according to, and can even be cancelled out by, the positioning of 
these elements relative to other elements.  I will now consider some examples that they 
provide respectively and argue that these are not convincing.  Brännmark gives the 
example of Smith achieving a great victory, that turns out to be the one event which 
“sends his life down a tragic path,”69 to illustrate his claim that parts of a life are only 
valuable depending on their location within a life as a whole.  Let’s imagine Smith is 
really Elvis and the achievement is recording his first album.  Let’s assume too that it was 
the huge amount of money and fame that followed that contributed to Elvis’s taking huge 
amounts of drugs and dying at a young age: surely a tragic end, given his talent.  Are we 
to say that his first album was consequently not a meaningful achievement, or that 
recording it was not a meaningful activity?  Surely not.  Brännmark seems to think it is 
natural to say that this achievement or activity is not as meaningful as it seemed at the 
time, given hindsight.  However, I think it is more natural to say that Elvis’s subsequent 
decline is something that subtracts some meaning from his life as a whole, but not from 
the achievement or activity itself, since the value of this is stable.  Similarly, it seems 
mistaken to consider Elvis Presley’s life any less meaningful simply because towards the 
end of his life he developed a drug addiction. We may think it is better to end one’s life 
                                                
69 Brännmark, “Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” p. 326. 
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on a “high note”, but I suspect this is more because we would prefer to avoid low periods 
in general.  Many great lives end in a deteriorated state since people tend to deteriorate as 
they grow older, and this does not detract from the meaning of their lives in my opinion.  
Presley’s drug addiction and decline are regrettable and in themselves do not add 
meaning to his life, but their timing seems to make little difference to meaning.  
Similarly, in the case of a concentration camp survivor we tend to think that meaning 
arises because of the virtues developed, not because as a result his life exhibits a certain 
pattern (of going from a bad patch to a better patch), and it seems to me that the meaning 
in such a life would not be threatened if his life happened to deteriorate once again as a 
result of disease.  Lastly it is also not clear to me that lack of repetitiveness (which is 
presumably another way that events could affect the meaningfulness of other events 
according to a narrative view) especially if what is being repeated are particularly 
“meaningful” activities, makes a difference to meaningfulness: for example, if one 
accepts that finding two cures adds more meaning than finding one, which seems 
reasonable, then why should ten cures not add even more meaning?  I do not find it 
plausible to dismiss the ten-cures case as no more meaningful on the grounds that it is 
repetitive or that it would get boring.  Even if there was much repetitive work involved in 
finding the cures, it seems that the value of the cures themselves far out weigh any draw-
back in meaning that repetition or boredom is likely to cause.   
 
The example that Levinson uses is of a man taking pleasure in beautiful music just after 
his wife has died.70  The idea is that the context, namely that his wife has just died, strips 
                                                
70 Levinson, “Intrinsic Value and the Notion of a Life,” p. 325. 
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the moment of its meaningfulness, meaning that “pleasure taken in listening to good 
music” cannot be considered a meaningful or intrinsically valuable element in a life in 
isolation of other factors.  This counter-example is implausible to me.  After discovering 
that someone important to one has died one’s reaction is often not what one would 
expect: one does not always break down into tears immediately or sink to the floor in 
despair.  Often, but not always, while in a state of shock and disbelief one might continue 
doing quite normal things and having relatively normal reactions to things, including 
beautiful views or music.  Often, but not always, the emotional reaction to a death takes 
days or even weeks to fully manifest, usually because of the shock such an incident 
causes.  While people’s reactions to death differ, it is not clear to me that enjoying beauty 
immediately after such an event is in any way morally questionable or worthless.  Even 
enjoying good music after murdering a busload of people would appear to add at least 
some meaning to a person’s life, granting that the serious immorality of such an action 
would detract from the meaningfulness of the life as a whole.  That is, while murder can 
compromise meaningfulness, it does not appear to strip certain elements of their inherent 
meaningfulness completely, as Levinson seems to claim. 
 
In my opinion the pattern of a life and the timing of its good and bad moments may in 
some cases enhance meaning slightly but not overwhelmingly.  Thus it seems to me that 
there is some stability to the value of certain elements, at least meaning-wise, so that 
certain elements are meaningful regardless of the context (i.e. their meaningfulness 
cannot be cancelled out by other elements), and if the meaningfulness of these elements 
is affected by proximity of other elements or other relations to other elements, this is 
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another matter to be added to or subtracted from the overall meaning sum.  In other 
words, “ordering of events” can be seen as another part of a life which adds meaning or 
detracts from it, in my opinion.   
 
Besides the counter-examples used being unconvincing, a second problem with Levinson 
and Brännmark’s account is that they imply that it is very difficult to specify what kinds 
of lives are meaningful.  If meaningfulness attaches only to “slices of lives”, then it 
appears that we need to know many details in order to assess whether a life is meaningful 
or not, and this seems counter-intuitive.  Most people do not know very many details of 
Mother Teresa’s life, but the ones they do know, namely, of all the poor and sick people 
she helped, seem sufficient to enable them to judge that her life was meaningful.  On 
Levinson’s account such people are misguided and should know many more details (in 
particular of timing of events) in order to be able to make such a judgement.  However, 
some activities and achievements, such as helping the poor and sick on such a scale, are 
just so admirable that they cannot be undermined by the context.  Brännmark argues that 
how we actually, in ordinary life, go about evaluating goodness of lives is by evaluating 
them as wholes, not by evaluating their parts,71 but again, this seems incorrect to me: 
again, we can take Mother Teresa as a case study.  Many people know only that she was a 
nun who helped lots of sick poor people, and would probably if asked say that they 
consider her to have lived a meaningful life.  They are not making this judgement based 
on considering her life as a whole-since they do not know enough information about her 
                                                
71 Brännmark, ‘Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” p. 330. 
 
  50 
 
life as a whole.  They are doing it based on considering just one part of her life: namely, 
her meaningful activity.  
 
Thus it seems to me that Levinson and Brännmark place too much emphasis on the 
ability of other factors to influence the meaning-weight of certain elements, and that they 
are mistaken in thinking that certain factors can rule out the meaningfulness of certain 
(but only certain) meaningful elements, such as finding cures for terrible diseases.  While 
such factors may enhance or detract from meaning, I think it is best to see them as 
another component in the bucket of meaning rather than necessary for meaning to attain 
at all, or calling into question the possibility that certain elements are meaningful in 
themselves.  While factors such as intentions and environment sometimes can affect 
whether certain elements count as meaningful so that some meaningful elements in a life 
might be more like “slices of life”, it is still possible to identify elements that make a life 
meaningful regardless of the circumstances and where they are positioned relative to 
other elements: curing people of cancer and artistic achievement are among these.  While 
identifying which kinds of elements are complexes, and how much meaning they carry 
relative to other elements, in particular stable elements, might be quite a complicated 
task, it seems right that we do not over-simplify the task of quantifying meaning, since 
meaning is not a substance.   
 
If we assume that some elements in a life have stability in terms of meaning, how 
plausible is it to say that some of the kind of features associated with the narrative 
approach are elements that contribute meaning to a life?  For one thing we might think 
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that these features are particularly important in terms of meaning: for example,  
Brännmark argues that the “narrative structure72” of a life, or how events are positioned 
in a life, is one of the most significant differences between human beings and animals; 
i.e. for human beings events take on varying significance depending on their contexts so 
that their lives form “narratively structured wholes”,73 and human beings know that they 
are somewhere along the path between life and death,74 while animals do not.  It is not 
the different contents that we are capable of filling our lives with that constitute the 
significant difference between us and animals,75 according to Brännmark.  However it 
seems to me that it is the different contents of our lives that mark the difference between 
us and animals: that is, our being capable of producing works of art, showing compassion 
or attaining knowledge (or some approximation to it) are more plausible reasons why 
human beings are different to animals.   
 
Related to the question of whether a “container view” is plausible is the question of 
whether there are different “types” of meaning, such as “deep”76 meaning, as opposed to 
shallow meaning.  One could argue that deep meaning is only achieved when all relevant 
appropriate factors are in place, such as order and interrelation of events, and that without 
this only shallow meaning is possible.  Is it the case that by “deep” people simply mean 
an extraordinary amount of meaning: in other words, are quantitative distinctions 
sufficient or must talk of meaning of life also take into account qualitative distinctions?77  
                                                
72 Brännmark, ‘Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” p. 321. 
73 Brännmark, ‘Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” p.322. 
74 Brännmark, ‘Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” p. 333. 
75 Brännmark, ‘Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning,” p. 322. 
76 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 809. 
77 Metz, “Recent Work on Meaning of Life,” p. 810. 
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Or is it the case that deep and shallow meaning, or whatever other “types” of meaning 
there are, are intrinsically incomparable, such as oranges and elephants, and cannot be 
added up in the same way that an umbrella’s being blue and yellow doe not make it 
green?  If there are qualitative distinctions in meaning, then comparison of 
meaningfulness, if not impossible, at least becomes complicated, for example in cases 
where one person has a little deep and a lot of shallow meaning, and another has no 
shallow meaning but a little more deep meaning.  It at least seems clear that “deep” 
meaning is intended to refer to cases of “better” meaning in some way, and it seems to 
me that to think of it in quantitative terms captures this superiority.  It also seems to me 
that most of the time there can be a decision made about which life is the more 
meaningful one, and this suggests that a quantitative notion of meaning is the one we tend 
to use.  In any event, for reasons of simplicity, I will assume that meaning comes in 
degrees, but not types. 
 
Enhancements and meaning 
 
If one then accepts the first premise that certain types of activities and accomplishments 
contribute meaning to a life, as well as the premise that by increasing the amount of these 
that one engages in one can increase the meaningfulness of one’s life, then one should 
accept that cybernetic enhancement can ceteris paribus add meaning to life. Cybernetic 
enhancement is one way of combating nature’s injustices that render some human beings 
relatively weak and incapable (even if they are not lacking capacities altogether, e.g. they 
are not blind or paralyzed, just very skinny or short-sighted or lacking good 
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coordination), and doing away with limitations that hold all human beings, including the 
most capable, back from certain meaningful lives.  Since physical limitations are often 
what lie in the way of people and the possibility of (or at least the possibility of large 
amounts of) meaningful achievements and activities, cybernetic enhancement can, by 
lessening or eliminating these limitations, make possible degrees of meaning not 
previously available to naturally weaker individuals, as well as make possible 
extraordinary degrees of meaning to those who naturally possess great ability.   
 
Thus it appears to me that cyborgs can have more meaningful lives than normal human 
beings, but only if the enhancements that they acquire are of a certain sort and are used in 
certain ways.  Meaningful enhancements must allow for more meaningful activity and 
achievements than would have previously been possible, and must also be actually used 
for the proper purposes.  If the enhancements are not actually used in the relevant ways, 
then having enhancements is akin to being born with a brilliant talent for running but 
choosing to watch TV instead.  Thus the mere possession of certain capacities does not 
(in most cases) increase meaning-it is rather their use in meaningful pursuits that does. 
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Chapter Three 
   
Overview 
 
So far I have argued that cybernetic enhancements can (at least in some cases and given 
certain conditions) increase meaning in a life by increasing the amount and variety of 
meaningful behaviour a person is capable of.  I have distinguished between meaningful 
activity and meaningful achievement, and I have provided a rough sketch of what it 
seems to me constitutes meaningful behaviour; namely that it develops or expresses what 
is most admirably human about us and that it involves real experiences.  Lastly I have 
argued that it is plausible that one can increase the meaningfulness of one’s life by 
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increasing the amount of meaningful parts it contains.  In the following chapters I will 
consider objections to the view that cybernetic enhancements can increase meaning in a 
life by increasing the amount and variety of meaningful behaviour a person is capable of.  
In this chapter I will consider specifically whether enhancements would undermine or 
threaten the amount of meaning that internal goods (such as virtues) and aspects of 
experience (such as effort and suffering) contribute to our lives.   
 
Could becoming a cyborg decrease meaningfulness of a life because cyborgs would be 
less likely to develop internal goods or expend effort? 
 
Maartje Schermer points out that what we really value in practices such as sport and 
education are the internal goods that are developed through these means, for example, 
courage, perseverance, discipline, various skills, etc, and she claims that enhancements 
could threaten the development of these and hence might in some cases be 
impermissible.78  This might appear to be a problem for my argument, since it is not 
obvious yet that cybernetic enhancements develop these kinds of goods.  The examples I 
have so far considered have emphasised results on the world, or activity in the world, as 
opposed to goods internal to the person who acts on the world, such as virtues and 
skills79.  Since virtues and skills require rationality and in some cases the capacity for 
certain emotion, determining whether enhancements would encourage, or discourage, or 
even prevent the development of these goods seems to be important in determining 
whether such enhancements can contribute meaning to a life.  If enhancements prevented 
                                                
78 Maartje.Schermer, “On the Argument that Enhancement is ‘Cheating’,” Journal of Medical Ethics 34 
(2008): p. 88.  
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the development of these goods in a person, then that person would not develop their 
capacities for rationality and love as much as they could have had they not been 
enhanced.   
 
For example, the security guard with an impenetrable synthetic skin and other 
enhancements that protect him from injury might be less likely to develop courage since 
the development of courage requires real danger to be present.  Furthermore, he may have 
no need to develop the skill of kung fu – a skill he might have pursued had he needed to 
defend himself.  A person lacking any courage whatsoever, or at least lacking any 
opportunity for showing courage, and a person lacking skills might seem to be less of a 
person, or to live an impoverished type of life, and one way to explain this 
impoverishment might be to say that he has less meaning in his life as a result of not 
developing certain internal goods (which in turn develop our capacities for rationality and 
certain emotion).  If the damage done to internal goods by enhancements is extensive 
enough, then this may outweigh any meaning that the enhancements contribute in terms 
of making possible certain types of activity in the world. 
  
Firstly, in reply, it is clear that at least some enhancements would not pose a threat to the 
development of internal goods.  Many of the enhancements I have mentioned so far are 
unlikely to pose a threat to the development of internal goods as long as they are not 
bolstered by other enhancements: for example, wing prostheses on their own do not seem 
to pose a threat to the development of courage: someone with wings can still be shot 
down, and is still vulnerable to disease.  Furthermore, many skills can be maintained if a 
 
  57 
 
person chooses to keep honing them and only certain enhancements would make certain 
skills redundant (so that if a person develops his rationality or capacity for love to a 
considerable extent by developing a skill, perhaps since he particularly enjoys it and 
hence spends much time on it, he could choose to get enhancements that do not interfere 
with his developing this skill).  It seems in fact that the cases that pose a threat to 
meaning by way of limiting the possibility of the development of internal goods are those 
that involve extensive enhancement.   
 
Secondly, it seems to me that the internal goods that might be lost by getting 
enhancements are only instrumentally meaningful, so that the loss of these will not affect 
meaning substantially.  I think it is plausible to say that some internal goods fall under a 
category which I will call “instrumentally meaningful states” and others under the 
category “finally meaningful internal states”.  The latter are internal states such as 
compassion, wonder/awe, appreciation of beauty, understanding, love and inspiration, 
that are meaningful for their own sakes: in other words, we have reason to bring them 
about for their own sakes and not merely for the sake of other mental states or behaviour 
that they might bring about.  Compassion, wonder/awe, appreciation of beauty, 
understanding, love and inspiration are not internal goods that seem to be threatened by 
enhancements: rather, in many cases these would seem to be developed further by 
enhancements.  For example, with wings one might be able to see many beautiful views 
which could give rise to awe or wonder, special perceptual organs could allow one to 
appreciate beauty that would not be possible to appreciate otherwise, and memory 
devices would probably aid understanding, and possibly inspiration (since remembering 
 
  58 
 
inspiring ideas in appropriate situations often accompanies being inspired).  Distinct from 
these states are “instrumentally meaningful states” such as courage, forgiveness, 
recognition of wrongs, perseverance and discipline which we value because of the finally 
meaningful states that they bring about.80 Through the development of instrumentally 
meaningful states more meaning is generally possible for a life since these states allow 
for opportunities for the development of finally meaningful internal states and the 
capacity for more meaningful behaviour.  For example, by being persistent one is more 
likely to learn how to play an instrument well and thus develop one’s appreciation of 
beauty, and by being courageous one tends to be in a better position to save lives than if 
one is not.  However, as long as these finally valuable internal states and meaningful 
behaviours can be brought about, it does not seem to me that there is loss in meaning if a 
life does not have instrumentally meaningful states.   For example, the security guard 
who has fingers implanted in him that can accurately shoot stun darts into any intruders, 
as well as super-sensory organs that allow him to hear better and see better so that he is 
more likely to detect the presence of an intruder, will still save lives even if he lacks 
perseverance, discipline and courage (since he need not concentrate much in order to 
detect an intruder, very little danger is posed to him personally and he is well-equipped to 
respond if an intruder does appear) and could even spend his time reading great literature 
or listening to beautiful music without worrying that someone was trespassing.    
 
Another thing that we seem to value merely as a means to more meaningful behaviour is 
effort, and again it seems to me that if this was compromised by enhancements, meaning 
                                                
80 I will be focusing mostly on effort and courage and assuming that the arguments I make about these also 
apply to the other instrumentally meaningful goods mentioned here. 
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would not be affected.  That is, it seems that it is the goal towards which the effort is 
directed that confers meaning, not effort as such: can we really deny that the 
achievements of the brilliant mathematician or genius philosopher are meaningful 
because they were able to achieve them with hardly any effort?  However, it seems that 
many would think that if enhancements eliminate effort, the meaningfulness that they 
produce would be undermined, at least to some extent, since many think that an 
achievement that “comes too easily” does not count as a meaningful achievement.  
According to William James, meaning in life comes from “the marriage…of some 
unhabitual ideal…with some fidelity, courage, and endurance; with some man’s or 
woman’s pains.”81  Another author who more recently emphasises the importance of 
effort in meaning is Larry James.  James lists as one of the conditions for something 
counting as an achievement that it be difficult for the person who achieves it.82  Many 
theorists hold that effort plays an important role in the meaningful life and would 
probably conclude that if enhancements eliminated effort, this would be problematic for 
their meaningfulness.  
 
Furthermore, effort is an aspect of experience that seems particularly likely to be 
threatened by enhancements.  Cybernetic enhancements appear to decrease the amount of 
effort that would be required in order to perform certain activities or accomplish certain 
things.  In fact, cybernetic enhancements seem to be designed precisely to reduce effort; 
Jean-François Lyotard claims that cybernetic enhancements “follow a principle…of 
optimal performance: maximizing output…and minimizing input”.83   
 
                                                
81 William James, On Some of Life’s Ideals (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1900): p. 91. 
82Larry James, “Achievement and the Meaningfulness of Life,” Philosophical Papers 34 (Nov. 2005): p. 
439. 
83 “Cyborg”. 
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The reason why I take effort and other internal goods to be merely instrumentally 
meaningful is that it appears that they only bring about meaningfulness in a life when 
used in order to bring about meaningful behaviour.  We do not seem to have good reason 
to bring them about for their own sakes because they are only meaningful when directed 
towards meaningful behaviour.  For example, effort is only meaningful when directed 
towards something meaningful like creating great art, rather than banging one’s head 
against one’s palm repeatedly where this brings about nothing further.   
 
Do we have reason to think that virtues such as courage and other elements of experience 
such as effort are not merely instrumental so that their loss through enhancements is more 
serious than I have suggested up to this point? Christine Korsgaard gives us at least some 
reason, if not conclusive reason, to think this.  In assessing her views I will be focusing 
mostly on the case of effort.  Korsgaard argues that it is mistaken to conflate intrinsic 
value and final value, or extrinsic and instrumental value.  That is, not everything that is 
valued as an end has intrinsic value and not everything that has extrinsic value is only 
valued instrumentally.84  Rather, valuing things instrumentally or as ends in themselves 
are “ways of valuing”, while valuing things intrinsically or extrinsically means valuing 
them because of their inherently valuable properties or valuing them because of their 
relations to other things that are have inherently valuable properties respectively.  Thus 
saying something has intrinsic value is to say it has goodness in itself, apart from its 
                                                
84 Christine Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review 92 (2004): p. 169.  
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relation to something else while saying it has extrinsic value is to say its goodness comes 
from some outside source.85   
 
Korsgaard uses the example of a mink coat as something that can be valued as an end 
(that is, one need not value it solely as a means to keeping warm in cold conditions – if 
this were the case, then one could easily replace a mink with something else that does the 
same job and such a coat should hold the same value, but this is not the case), but the 
value of which comes from its extrinsic properties, since “were it not for the ways in 
which humans respond to cold, we would not care about [mink coats] or even think about 
them”.86  If we assume that Korsgaard is right that such cases exist of things that are 
finally valuable, or good for their own sakes, but also extrinsically valuable – that is, 
finally valuable only under certain conditions, then do we have reason to think that 
virtues such as courage, effort, and skills are such things?  If they are then perhaps their 
loss is more serious since they are not merely instrumentally meaningful. 
 
An opponent may agree with me that effort has extrinsic value (and in this case the value 
in question is meaningfulness): that is, its value is conferred on it from another source, 
such as the conditions under which it occurs.  In the case of effort, the relevant conditions 
are that the effort results in good outcomes such as saving lives as opposed to head 
banging.  However, he could deny that it is only instrumentally valuable, and one reason 
to assert this might be to say that we do not only want to exert effort for the sake of what 
it will bring about: rather we want to exert effort for the sake of exerting effort, on 
                                                
85 Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” p. 170. 
86 Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” p. 185. 
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condition that what is brought about is meaningful.  Thus effort is like a mink coat in that 
we value it extrinsically but also for its own sake.   
 
I will try to determine whether this objection works by considering again the case of the 
mink coat.  According to Korsgaard it has final value – we value it as an end in itself and 
not merely a means – and this can be seen by our reluctance to replace it with a parka 
coat, but nonetheless we value it extrinsically – not independently of the circumstances.  
If effort is a similar case, then we should want it for its own sake, not independently of 
the circumstances, but on condition that it is aimed towards meaningful behaviour87 (and 
similarly with virtues and skills).  If effort is only instrumentally valuable, then we should 
only value it for what it brings about, namely meaningful behaviour.  In the mink coat 
case the test of whether the coat was merely instrumentally valuable was to ask whether 
we would be happy to replace it with something that brought about the same effects, 
namely warmth.  Thus in the effort case, if replacing effort with something that would 
have the same effects is something we would gladly do, then effort is only instrumentally 
valuable.  So, if we were to bring about meaningful behaviour by simply intending it, 
would we want to?  Or would we want to exert effort too?  If the latter is the case, then 
effort is finally valuable.  It seems to me that in many cases we really wish that intention 
was all that was necessary to bring about meaningful behaviour (which explains the 
longing we might have sometimes that we could have abilities uploaded onto our brains, 
as in the movie The Matrix).  Perhaps in cases where we would like to exert effort the 
                                                
87 Effort is clearly not intrinsically meaningful, since if it was, then effort alone and directed towards any 
behaviour would be sufficient to contribute meaning, and it is clear that this is not the case, since if it were 
then banging one’s head against one’s palm repeatedly would count as meaningful, and clearly it does not. 
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reason we would want to do this is to prove the strength of our intentions – to others as 
well as to ourselves.   
 
One way to see that courage is not something we value for its own sake is that in a case 
where we imagine someone who achieves the same amount of meaning that the security 
guard does, but who is courageous too, there does not seem to be a good reason to want 
to be the second person over the first.  While we may in fact prefer to be the courageous 
security guard if given the choice, this seems a bit odd if the courage has no role to play 
in any future situations.  Wanting to be the courageous security guard in this case is akin 
to wanting to be someone who owns a cake that she can never eat rather than someone 
who does not.  If the cake is to provide no nourishment or pleasure, then wanting to be 
the person who owns the cake seems pointless, or at least far less desirable than if eating 
it and getting pleasure out of it was a possibility.  Similarly, courage that has no 
opportunity to be exercised since the person concerned has no reason to fear things, does 
not seem to be something worth having88.  The desire to be the (uselessly) courageous 
person is possibly explained by the fact that in our society we tend to hold effort in high 
esteem – but the reason for this seems to be that it tends to increase meaningful behaviour 
and as a result we have come to associate the two to a great extent. 
 
One of the reasons why we might think that courage, perseverance and discipline do not 
seem to be meaningful in themselves (even if they are praiseworthy when they are 
appropriate in the circumstances) is that they require the presence of suffering in order to 
                                                
88 It is important to note that if courage were necessary in certain situations for a cyborg, then he would 
have the opportunity to develop it, assuming that danger is necessary for the development of courage.   
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be appropriate responses, and it would make no sense to bring them about for their own 
sake.  Similarly it would make no sense to try to bring about for their own sake 
forgiveness and recognition of the wrongs one is responsible for (since this would require 
bringing about suffering too), but, where they are appropriate, they are instrumentally 
meaningful since they tend to develop compassion and understanding, and since they 
might inspire meaningful activity such as helping others.  The meaningfulness of these 
states arises from the goal towards which they are directed, such as meaningful behaviour 
or meaningful relationships, but since there is no reason to bring them about for their own 
sake, it seems they are merely instrumentally meaningful states.   
 
An opponent could object to the claim that these states are only instrumentally valuable 
by providing an example of something that is finally valuable, such an artwork, and that 
nonetheless can only be brought about through suffering (perhaps the model which the 
painting depicts was forced at gunpoint to sit where she sat, and this was the only way to 
capture the particular expression on her face).  This case is presented not so much to 
suggest that sometimes there is reason to bring about suffering (even if doing so is 
wrong), if by doing so one is bringing about something intrinsically valuable, as to show 
that something can be finally good, or good for its own sake even if it requires bringing 
about suffering in order to bring it about.  Thus, according to this objection, effort could 
be finally valuable, or valued for its own sake, even if it requires the existence of 
suffering in order to be meaningful.   
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In response it seems to me that even if there are possible cases where the fact that 
bringing something about for its own sake requires suffering does not prevent it from 
being finally meaningful, effort is nonetheless not one of these cases.  The reason is that 
effort simply does not in itself justify the bringing about of suffering: it is simply not 
valuable enough unless it results in valuable outcomes such as increased mental or 
physical strength.  If we were to bring about effort for its own sake we would need to 
create a situation in which effort was required, and this would probably require suffering 
since effort by definition seems to require some kind of strain.  However, if this suffering 
that was required for exerting effort resulted in nothing meaningful (or otherwise 
valuable), it would be unjustified: it would be silly to bring it about.  Conflicting 
intuitions on this seem to be caused by thinking that effort always does result in 
something good – such as increased strength of character or honing of the mind and body, 
but it is at least logically possible that one can exert oneself without bringing about 
anything good and it is this case that is relevant since I am considering whether effort can 
be meaningful apart from the meaningful behaviour that it is oriented towards.  An 
example of a case where bringing about effort for its own sake where no further good 
could come of it is one where someone expended effort in not moving for two days.  In 
such a case the person would probably, at least at some point, begin to suffer from 
frustration and severe muscle aches, and if effort were good for its own sake then it 
seems to me that such a person would gladly accept this.  However, such a situation is 
one that most sane people would be very eager to avoid, barring very peculiar 
circumstances.  If effort (and the accompanying strain and suffering) were meaningful for 
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its own sake, then it seems to me that we would have reason to want to do such things, 
but clearly we do not.   
 
However, even if internal goods such as courage and perseverance are actually finally 
(though also extrinsically valuable), it is not clear that enhancements would eliminate the 
need for them. One of the reasons for this is that, as I have mentioned, most cyborgs will 
still be vulnerable, and this will require and therefore give opportunities to develop 
courage, and most cyborgs will still run up against obstacles to meaningful behaviour 
(such as complex decision making), and will thus need qualities such as perseverance.  
Furthermore, the acquiring of enhancements themselves seems to be one way in which 
these virtues can be developed, because getting an operation to acquire such 
enhancements would be frightening, and would reflect an admirable sacrifice (that is, of 
one’s former appearance and the comforts of familiarity with one’s body) for the sake of 
worthy pursuits and so would require courage.  Having enhancements is likely to increase 
one’s confidence as one’s capacities increase, and this is likely to increase one’s efforts to 
persevere.  Thus even if one maintains that states such as courage and perseverance are 
finally meaningful, it would be unreasonable to argue that enhancements should be 
prohibited on those grounds since it is unlikely that after cybernetic enhancements the 
need for them will ever disappear completely, and this can at least be avoided by making 
sure that no one is ever enhanced to the point of invincibility.  Similarly, even if one 
maintains that effort is not merely instrumentally meaningful, it is not clear that 
enhancements would eliminate the need for it.  For one thing, it seems more likely that 
enhancements would require that we expend more mental effort, even if they would not 
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require as much physical effort.  This is because the cyborg will have more abilities and 
thus more opportunities for action, and will hence need to do a lot of decision making 
about which meaningful behaviours he should pursue.   
 
Is effort necessary for meaningful behaviour, and if so, how much is required? 
 
Even if effort is not merely instrumentally valuable, if it turns out that it is necessary for 
meaningful behaviour, then the types of enhancements that could increase the meaning of 
one’s life would be far less than what I have so far supposed, especially if a certain 
(substantial) amount of effort is required, and this is not a conclusion I would like to 
accept.  Consider a case where a person acquires artificial fingers and a memory device 
that allow her to perform a beautiful concerto. Our initial response may be that this is not 
meaningful since it does not require effort.  
 
However in other cases effort does not seem necessary for meaning.  For example, a 
memory recorder could help a scientist to move quicker in his research and gain 
understanding that he would have been previously incapable of with little or no effort.   
Perhaps one of the reasons why we think the scientist need not expend effort in order for 
his activity to be meaningful is that the direct results of his research are only valuable as a 
means to technological or medical benefit, which is itself only instrumentally valuable – 
perhaps as a means of achieving greater general well-being for the population, or a 
situation in which people are capable of meaningful lives.  However, in the case of the 
pianist, the activity itself is what is intrinsically valuable, and perhaps this is why we feel 
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that she should have exerted herself in order for her activity to count as meaningful.  
Thus perhaps intrinsically meaningful behaviour requires effort.   
 
However, if this were true, then it would seem that we would feel similarly about cases 
where the knowledge in question is valuable in itself: do we think in the case of 
knowledge of logical principles, or universal truths, that it is important that someone 
expend effort in attaining such knowledge?  It seems to me that we do not.  While the 
effortless philosophical genius may be annoying to his industrious colleagues, it seems 
mistaken to think that his understanding counts for less than theirs.  This suggests that at 
least some cases of finally meaningful behaviour do not require effort.   
 
 In fact even the piano case does not seem to require effort in my opinion.  It seems to me 
that while effort may enhance such a performance, the performance itself is meaningful 
as long as it is played with the right intentions and artistic understanding present in the 
person performing.  If the piece is a mere mechanical recitation of notes, and not played 
with understanding and expression, then the audience will feel it, and the performance 
will lose its meaningfulness.  This is assuming that the enhancements are sophisticated 
enough to allow a person to exert some control on the delivery of the piece, but this does 
not seem so far-fetched.  In playing the piano, playing many of the notes becomes almost 
unconscious-much of the actual physical activity of playing the piano is learned by rote.  
Thus though the enhanced person would skip out some of the steps in being able to play 
the concerto, she would nonetheless be capable of expressing her understanding of the 
piece, and it is in this, and in the deliverance of the piece to the audience, that the 
meaning lies, in my opinion.  
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Thinking that effort is a necessary condition for meaning, or overplaying in other ways 
the role of effort in meaningfulness, seems to me to be explained by the fact that in the 
world as we know it most meaningful activities and achievements require effort.  
However, it is misguided to conclude from this association that effort is always required 
for meaning.  Thus it seems to me that effort is not a necessary condition for meaning, 
but something that sometimes enhances meaning, in cases where the effort is exerted for 
the sake of meaningful behaviour.   
 
Is some kind of suffering, or at least the possibility of suffering, necessary for meaning? 
 
If effort is not necessary for behaviour to be meaningful, is the possibility of some kind 
of suffering necessary?  I will argue that it is not.  However, many feel that the possibility 
that things could go horribly wrong and cause terrible suffering is a condition for our 
activities and achievements to be meaningful.  William James describes a utopian society 
where everyone is safe from harm, intelligent and humane and there is nothing but order 
and ease, and argues that what is missing from this is “the element that gives to the 
wicked outer world all its moral style, expressiveness, and picturesqueness - the element 
of precipitousness…of strength and strenuousness, intensity and danger”. 89  To James, 
“[t]his order is too tame…this goodness too uninspiring.  This human drama without a 
villain or a pang… this atrocious harmlessness – I cannot abide with them.  Let me take 
my chances again in the big outside worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings.  
There are the heights and depths, the precipices and the steep ideals…”.90  In other words, 
without suffering a life cannot be meaningful according to James, or at the very least, the 
                                                
89 James, On Some of Life’s Ideals, p. 57. 
90 James, On Some of Life’s Ideals, p. 55-56. 
 
  70 
 
most important behaviour involves suffering or at least the possibility of it.  Without 
danger and without the chance for failure, there is also no chance for heroism in such a 
world, and such a world consequently appears boring, since what inspires us is “Sweat 
and effort, human nature strained to its uttermost and on the rack, yet getting through 
alive”,91 and pointless.  While suffering and effort are distinct, they are related concepts, 
since often exerting effort includes some amount of suffering.   
 
However, it is one thing to read books about suffering and be inspired by the great feats 
of literary heroes, and quite another to be actually suffering terribly at the hands of 
villains, in the clutches of disease, or under extreme mental strain.  It seems to me that 
while this suffering and strain may be satisfying to read about (particularly if it results in 
meaningful behaviour), and a great relief to survive, our enthusiasm for the genuine item 
is not very strong: in general we tend to avoid suffering as much as we can.  While it 
seems to be common to think that terrible things happening to people can make them 
better people in some way, in many cases terrible events can decrease meaningfulness of 
a life rather than increase it, for example by robbing a person of his loved ones.  
Furthermore there are clearly cases of meaningful behaviour that require no suffering, 
such as creating some art.  
 
However, there is reason to think that the lives of cyborgs would still include the 
possibility of suffering, i.e., cyborgs would still suffer, or be vulnerable to suffering, even 
if they would not suffer as much, or even if they would suffer in different kinds of ways 
from those who are unenhanced (for example from the mental anguish that results from 
giving up a limb).  Thus, even if one accepts that the possibility for suffering is a 
                                                
91 James, On Some of Life’s Ideals, p. 58 
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requirement for behaviours to be meaningful, becoming a cyborg does not entail that one 
will thereby eliminate suffering from one’s life. 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
In this chapter I have argued that cybernetic enhancements for the most part do not 
threaten the development of internal goods such as virtues and skills and aspects of 
experience such as suffering and effort.  However, in the cases that they do, this is not 
particularly regrettable since, it seems to me, the types of internal goods or aspects of 
experience that are compromised are only instrumentally meaningful.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Enhancements as tools and cyborgs as machine-like 
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In this chapter I discuss another objection to the claim that becoming a cyborg is one way 
to increase the meaningfulness of one’s life, and focus in particular on the aspect of 
becoming a cyborg that seems particularly unattractive to many.  For many the intuitive 
response to the idea of becoming a cyborg might be that there is something pointless or 
unnecessary, as well as disconcerting, about incorporating machines and our bodies to 
such an extent.  One reason to think that enhancement is pointless or unnecessary, even if 
one grants that effort is only instrumentally meaningful and not necessary for meaning, is 
that cybernetic enhancements are akin to simply acquiring tools such as downloading 
better software, or buying a special suit or gadget that allow one more success in the 
activities that one undertakes.  Thus one may conclude that behaviour carried out as a 
result of enhancements does not count as meaningful in the same way that winning a race 
with the aid of performance inducing drugs is not meaningful since in both cases it is 
dubious whether the behaviour can be attributed to the person.  One reason why 
cybernetic enhancement might strike us disconcerting is that it appears extreme and 
unnatural and thus appears to render us machine-like, or to threaten our identity in other 
ways, so that it is preferable to simply buy tools rather than implant chips or replace 
working, but inferior body parts.  In this section I firstly consider the similarity between 
enhancements and tools, independently of whether enhancements eliminate effort or not, 
and whether any similarities that are identified have negative consequences for the 
meaning contributed by enhancements.  Secondly I consider how getting enhancements 
may affect our identities, as individuals and as a species, and whether this can prevent 
enhancements from contributing meaning to our lives, or at least severely decrease the 
amount of meaning enhancements can contribute to our lives. 
 
Are cybernetic enhancements akin to acquiring tools or taking performance enhancing 
drugs and therefore not able to increase meaning in a life? 
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The first concern is that cybernetic enhancement would not count in terms of meaning for 
a person’s achievements, since the cyborg would not be responsible in the right kind of 
way for the behaviour made possible by the enhancements.  Thus the enhancements may 
be thought to be living our lives for us.  Furthermore becoming enhanced may be 
considered cheating, at least in some sense: i.e. the artificial limbs or implanted gadgets 
cannot be factored into a person’s achievement just as an athlete’s taking performance 
enhancing drugs gives us reason not to assess an athlete’s performance as her own.  The 
recent debate in the newspapers over whether Oscar Pistorius should be allowed to 
compete against able bodied athlete’s despite his artificial leg replacements suggests that 
some would not consider achievements acquired by these means as legitimate sources of 
meaning, since the outcomes of using such means would not count as achievements.   
The idea then is that for something to be an achievement of person S, S must be 
responsible for the achievement, but S is not responsible for whatever is accomplished by 
means of enhancements.  Although I have argued previously that responsibility is not 
necessary for some meaning to accrue to one’s life, as in the case of a scientist 
accidentally discovering a cure for a terrible disease, or the beautiful comatose woman, if 
cyborgs have only a weak degree of responsibility, the meaning that enhancements 
contribute to their lives might be far less than I would like to think. 
 
Here the analogy with tools comes to the cyborgs’ rescue.  Just because I have written 
this paper with the aid of the computer does not mean that I cannot be said to be 
responsible for having written it, and just because someone uses a car to win a Formula 
one race does not mean that he is not responsible for winning the race.  Computers and 
cars are tools that make possible things that were not possible without them, and a 
person’s using them need not mean that no meaning can arise from the behaviour.  
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Scientists use all sorts of sophisticated tools in the process of making discoveries that can 
increase medical knowledge or knowledge of our world with the result of making other’s 
lives better, and surely this work counts as no less meaningful for coming about in this 
way.  Some enhancements might actually amount to cheating, or not be attributable to a 
person but this is only in certain contexts, for example if enhancements are used in sports 
in which effort is highly prized, where there is an assumption that competitors are 
unenhanced and in which there are rules against such enhancements (perhaps because 
such enhancements are only available to a select wealthy few).   
 
Furthermore, since cybernetic enhancements are internal, they become a part of a person: 
they become as much a part of a person as a pace maker.  However, unlike a pace maker, 
in cases where enhancements help to contribute meaning to life the enhancements are 
used by a person intentionally in aid of a certain meaningful behaviour.  Thus enhanced 
behaviour is still attributable to the person, and not merely to the enhancements.   More 
importantly, by deciding to get an enhancement, a person becomes responsible for the 
activity made possible.  This is not the case where the activity is only possible as a result 
of luckily being born with good genes – in fact because of the decision involved, it seems 
that the meaningful behaviour might be even more attributable, but at least equally 
attributable, to the cyborg than the behaviour of people with lucky genes is attributable to 
them.  In the case of other meaningful achievements, our acknowledgement of the 
achiever’s responsibility for the achievement often arises from noting sacrifices the 
achiever has made; for example, the amount of time they spent training, or money spent 
acquiring tools that make possible certain experiments but acquiring enhancements also 
involves sacrifice, for example, of healthy limbs and of time spent acquiring enough 
money to purchase them. 
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Could loss of identity as a result of enhancement pose a threat to or decrease the 
meaning cybernetic enhancements may contribute to a life? 
 
In this section I consider six ways in which a person’s identity could be thought to be 
compromised by enhancements and whether this poses a threat for meaning by taking 
“Jack the Fireman Cyborg” as a case study.  
 
The most obvious cases where becoming a cyborg would threaten meaning for reasons of 
loss of identity is where a cyborg becomes extensively enhanced.  The kinds of examples 
of cyborgs that I have speculated about so far have sported one enhancement, but it is 
possible that a person could have two or even tens of enhancements.  Given my view that 
more of certain activities can add meaning to life, and given that adding meaning to life 
seems to be something that most people have a strong desire to do, it would seem that I 
would think it reasonable, and many people would want to, get as many enhancements as 
possible.  Extensive cases of enhancement are slightly (or, for some, particularly) chilling 
and are likely to inspire repulsion or aversion.  Let us then imagine an über-cyborg – a 
cyborg who is vastly enhanced: Jack, the Fireman Cyborg.  All his muscles have been 
replaced by synthetic muscles, his bones by synthetic bones, his blood by synthetic super-
blood, his organs, one by one, by synthetic, long lasting, super organs.  His memory has 
been amplified with the use of a memory recorder system, extra processing system, GPS 
system.  Bit by bit this cyborg has become as cyborg-ed as possible, in the sense that all 
that is left untouched is perhaps his brain.  Let us assume Jack does not need to eat or 
drink – he only needs to take injections.  He is not vulnerable to disease, and is very 
unlikely to be killed, and likely to live for a very long time.    
 
 
  76 
 
The first type of loss of identity I will consider is the most extreme type: that Jack 
becomes essentially other than who he was prior to enhancement.  This might be the case 
if Jack’s brain cells were replaced, so that a ‘ship of Theseus’ problem arises.  However, 
one reason to think that becoming considerably other than what one is need not 
compromise meaning is that we tend to think that sacrificing one’s life for one’s friend 
contributes meaning to one’s life (and clearly in this situation one becomes considerably 
other than what one was - i.e. dead).  Since it may be meaningful to kill oneself under 
certain conditions, this type of loss of identity need not eliminate meaningfulness.  If we 
assume that Jack was previously a concerned citizen in a country raged by terrible fires 
that were causing extensive loss of life, giving up his identity in order to best carry out 
this task seems to be a particularly admirable thing for him to do.  The cases of losses of 
identity I will consider now are less extreme but may nonetheless also be thought of as 
compromising meaning. 
 
When we imagine Jack, we imagine a synthetic looking creature with a steely look in his 
eye.  The next worry I will address is that Jack has become other than what he is by 
becoming synthetic, or unnatural, and even getting fewer enhancements than Jack seems 
to be extreme.  Since there is something unappealing about becoming even minimally 
synthetic and doing something as extreme as having a limb amputated, in some cases 
tools are preferable to getting enhancements.  It would make no sense for someone to get 
an enhancement which made possible an activity that would have been made equally 
possible by a tool: for example, to implant a retractable toothbrush into one’s finger 
would be silly.  It would also be wasteful given the amount of labour and material needed 
to make such an implant effective.  However, in many cases it seems that there are good 
reasons to get enhancements rather than tools, and where incorporating something 
unnatural into one’s body is a small price to pay fro the results.  Pace makers are 
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synthetic, but people who need them accept this because they allow them to live.  It 
would make sense to get cybernetic enhancements rather than tools when the activity it 
makes possible would make a huge difference for good in the world: e.g. would greatly 
reduce human suffering, and when these kinds of enhancements cannot be replaced by 
tools, or when they are vastly more efficient than tools, or when the technology required 
to make a tool that would make possible the activity that an implant would make possible 
is only likely to be acquired in the far off future.  Getting wings used to rescue drowning 
people are an example of a case where it would make sense to get enhanced since wings 
would allow a person to fly close to the ocean or a flooded area and see people more 
easily that someone in a helicopter might, and it would also be a faster process than 
trying to rescue a person with a helicopter.  Thus in the case of certain types of 
enhancements, the unnaturalness of the enhancement is a small price to pay given the 
meaning that could result.   
 
Furthermore, cyborgs may seem unnatural because of the strange body shapes they may 
acquire from being enhanced.  However, a certain body shape does not seem to be part of 
our conception of the most valuable things about human beings: for example, a 
hunchback is not considered less human merely because of his shape. Even people 
without limbs or lacking senses are not considered less “human”, in either sense that I 
have used it: for example, the drummer in the band Def Leopard, Rick Allen (who 
continued to play drums with one arm after his left arm was amputated) and Helen Keller 
are not considered alien, and are respectively considered to be leading and to have led 
exemplary lives.  Thus the fact that enhancements might render people less natural or 
“human” looking would not undermine the meaningfulness they could contribute to a 
life. Though cyborgs like Jack might seem to resemble machines more than they 
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resemble human beings, resemblance to being human is not relevant to meaning on my 
account: as long as these cyborgs engaged in behaviour that count as most admirably 
human, the meaning of their lives would not be threatened, even if the aesthetic appeal of 
their lives were affected to some extent.  While I argued earlier that being beautiful could 
add some meaning to one’s life because of the experiences this could cause in others, 
being beautiful is certainly not necessary for meaning.  Thus cyborgs would be human in 
the way that matters. 
 
Considering Jack again, another thing that might bother some of us is that he may be 
lacking many of the skills that ordinary people tend to cultivate, for example, playing 
tennis. Thus the third worry is that Jack seems too goal-orientated, and too focused on 
one purpose.  It might seem that there is some meaning in doing things that are all things 
considered trivial, such as eating ice cream, because this would be a nice contrast and 
because it would prevent slavishness to one or more goals.  That is, there might be 
something admirably human about keeping a balance in one’s life: being able to engage 
in a variety of meaningful behaviours, and furthermore not to prioritise one goal to the 
extent that other meaningful parts of a life suffer very badly.   
 
However it seems to me that while keeping a balance in one’s life and engaging in many 
varied activities may enhance meaning, particularly meaningful behaviour (such as 
curing diseases or producing great art) will contribute more meaning-wise.  Many of the 
people whose lives we often attribute great amounts of meaning to are dedicated to a 
single purpose: for example, Mother Theresa was dedicated largely to the purpose of 
helping the sick and poor.  Paul Edwards argues that what Pasteur, Lenin, Winston 
Churchill and Margaret Sanger have in common besides being clear examples of people 
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who have lived meaningful lives is that they “had some dominant, over-all goal or goals 
which gave direction to a great many of the individual’s actions”.92   
 
Some people who are too goal-orientated may be unpleasant to be around, but this in 
itself does not seem to threaten meaning too substantially.  Even if there are cases where 
extreme goal directedness leads to a situation where a person is, as Cottingham describes, 
“cut off from the patterns of feeling that make us naturally disposed to have some 
minimal concern for our fellow creatures”,93 or where a person’s meaningful 
relationships suffer, this does not threaten my general argument that enhancements can 
increase meaning in a life if used in certain ways, since this would be a way in which it 
would be unwise to use them in.  Nonetheless, if we assume that cybernetic technology is 
likely to improve drastically, it is possible that we can build cyborgs in such a way that 
they are capable of many varied activities, and anyway getting enhancements does not in 
itself seem to predispose someone to stop engaging in other activities, rather this depends 
on his own choice. 
 
A fourth worry for identity is that enhancements may threaten our identity in terms of 
turning us into creatures that can plan far more of their lives than has ever been possible 
for human beings.  Thus the possibility of becoming enhanced would introduce a 
radically new capability to the human being.  This kind of planning of one’s own life 
might seem objectionable in the same sense that planning the characteristics of one’s 
children through gene therapy seems objectionable to many and the main reason for these 
sentiments that springs to mind might be that people who do this are ‘playing God’, and 
                                                
92 Paul Edwards, “The Meaning and Value of Life,” in E. D. Klemke, ed., The Meaning of Life, second 
edition (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000): pp. 143-144. 
93 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 28. 
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for some theists this may seem arrogant, or morally wrong.  But another reason is that it 
might seem to interfere with the meaning that is contributed by these enhancements since 
it would make us so different from what we are.   
 
However, perhaps this is a way in which we want to be different from what we currently 
are.  Already we try to control our lives and appearances in many ways, and perhaps 
enhancement is just an extension of this.  Furthermore perhaps enhancements present an 
opportunity for making more rational choices and thereby bringing about better results 
than one’s genes have, and given my theory of meaning this might be an acceptable or 
even attractive way in which our identity would change as a result of enhancements. 
 
A fifth point is that enhancements may eliminate the need for us to engage in activities 
that currently make up a large part of our lives.  That is, someone might argue that even if 
cyborgs might develop to a greater extent what we most value about human beings, such 
as rationality, creativity and relationships, other aspects that are distinctive of human 
beings, even if they are not generally greatly esteemed, could be lost by cyborgs and this 
would be problematic for meaning since it would mean us becoming substantially other 
than what we are.  For example, part of our concept of what it is to be human is the 
necessity of eating, drinking and having leisure time.  Part of our concept of human 
children is that they have time ‘just to be kids’.  In the world now, without the possibility 
of sophisticated enhancement, these activities are such that without them human beings 
are likely either to stop functioning (by not eating or drinking), or experience difficulties 
in the world, for example, the social stresses of not learning to relate to and interact with 
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others easily which might result from denying oneself leisure time, or denying children 
the space to ‘just be children’.  However, it seems that we might still value these 
activities for more than just their role in development of other valuable qualities since 
there seems to be something at least alien, and possibly a little repulsive about a human 
being who does not engage in these activities at all, even if they have the valuable 
qualities that these activities are supposed to foster.   
 
In response perhaps one could side with the “Transhumanists” who believe that what it is 
to be human is not something that is fixed.94   Here it is important to make clear that the 
kind of “humanness” at stake here is the kind tied to the human species, not the looser 
concept of “what is most admirably human”.  While eating and drinking and ‘just being 
kids’ is part of our concept of the human being now, it needn’t be in the future.  After all, 
human beings have evolved like other animals and are strikingly different from some of 
our more distant ancestors.  Our environments have through technological advancement 
become more sophisticated so that while making a fire for warmth and hunting down 
food were necessities thousands of years ago, they are unnecessary for most people now.  
In general, life has become more comfortable in many ways since then, often owing to 
technological innovations that were often regarded with great suspicion at the time of 
their inventions.  Thus, perhaps eating and drinking are destined to be outdated human 
characteristics, and we should not feel such anguish at their passing.  Even if we do feel 
some discomfort about it now, perhaps this discomfort is merely a result of years of 
conditioning and will eventually disappear once we realise just how beneficial the 
                                                
94 Bernard Daly, “Toward a Brave New World?” America 191 (2004): p. 18. 
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enhancements are.  Transhumanists think that the mere “humanness” of a trait is not a 
good reason to value it,95 and that human limitations should be transcended.   
 
A last way that identity could be threatened is if eliminating limitations through 
becoming enhanced could have the affect of changing what we value.  Martha Nussbaum 
writes, “Our finitude, and in particular our mortality, which is a particularly central case 
of our finitude, and which conditions all our other awareness of limit, is a constitutive 
factor in all valuable things’ having for us the value that in fact they have.”96 That is, 
“Gods are…dead to, closed off from, the value that we see, the beauty that delights 
us…from the struggle to do good work inside the constraints of a finite human life.”97  If 
part of what we are is to be limited, and if not being limited or drastically decreasing the 
extent to which we are limited through becoming enhanced would exclude important 
meaningful things from our lives, or at least prevent us from finding them meaningful 
anymore, then it would seem we have no reason of meaning to become enhanced.  
 
Firstly, in reply, it seems to me that cybernetic enhancements are unlikely to eliminate 
limitation altogether, as I have pointed out in the section on effort and suffering in 
Chapter Three, especially if the enhancements acquired are not extensive.  Secondly, 
Nussbaum is particularly concerned with the limitation that death presents and seems to 
play a large role in how we value things on her account98 but many cybernetic 
enhancements would not offer immortality or even prolonged life: rather they would offer 
the possibility of doing more with the time one has.  Although this may also seem to 
upset (or at least change) the temporal structure of relationships and one’s life to some 
                                                
95 Alan Dacey, “The New Perfectionism,” Free Inquiry 24 (2004): p. 26. 
96 Nussbaum, "Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature," p. 336. 
97 Nussbaum, "Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature," p. 339. 
98 Nussbaum, "Mortal Immortals: Lucretius on Death and the Voice of Nature," p. 341. 
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extent, it may be thought to do so to a lesser extent than immortality would.  It seems 
possible to me that if limitations are reduced, as in the case of most enhancements, rather 
than eliminated, as in the case of those that offer immortality (and I will assume for the 
sake of argument here that such enhancements are possible), we would in fact be able to 
do more of what we value rather than losing our ability to value certain things that we 
currently find valuable.  If this is the case, then there would be reason to avoid 
enhancements that offered immortality in favour of more humble ones that nonetheless 
would allow one to pack one’s life full of more meaningful elements, and again 
enhancements not increasing meaning in one’s life would depend chiefly on how one 
chose to use them, rather than on some problematic change in identity that they brought 
about.  Thus it is not clear to me that all enhancements would affect our ability to value 
meaningful things in the way that we currently do, and so it does not seem that 
enhancements necessarily pose a threat to identity in the sense of fundamentally changing 
what we value. 
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Chapter Five 
 
What are the ethical implications of cybernetic enhancements and will these undercut any 
meaning that enhancements may contribute to a life? 
 
A problem with enhancements that is often dramatised in movies about enhanced beings, 
for example, The Incredible Hulk and Iron Man, is that as much as these superior powers 
can be used for the good, and to increase meaning, they can also be abused and used to 
harm others.  In The Incredible Hulk, a soldier is injected with a substance that makes 
him just as, if not more, powerful that the Hulk.  The soldier then goes on to create 
mayhem and destruction.  In Iron Man an evil man who gets hold of the technology 
necessary for making an iron man suit creates similar suits with the intention of becoming 
more powerful and to gain financially, not to serve the greater good.  While Iron Man 
might not be a cyborg, theoretically speaking, it is easy to see that just as wings can be 
used to save flood victims, they can also be used for kidnapping, and just as synthetic 
muscles can be used by super-firemen to lift heavy objects off people and carry them out 
of burning buildings, they can also be used by evil people to kill people.  The problem of 
the possibility of evil scientists getting hold of the technology, or good scientists being 
overpowered by evil men with powerful weapons, is one that would need to be taken 
seriously in deciding whether enhancement technology should be developed, and just 
who should be enhanced.  In this section I consider how acting immorally or living in an 
immoral society could negatively affect the amount of meaning that enhancements are 
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capable of contributing to a life as well as some of the negative ethical implications of 
enhancements and how society could go about trying to mitigate them. 
 
The lives of people who do not use enhancements in morally acceptable ways are 
unlikely to increase in meaning.  This possibility does not prima facie threaten my thesis, 
since I am only defending the view that enhancements that are used in certain ways will 
be candidates for increasing meaning, but noting this fact helps to clarify further what I 
mean by “certain” ways, rather than others.  Given that meaning is a category of value, it 
is perhaps not surprising that we are hesitant to attribute meaning to the lives of people 
that we do not value.  Cottingham notes, “It would certainly not be a very natural use of 
our language to bestow the epithet ‘meaningful’ on the life of the angry, resentful, 
greedy, ambitious, selfish [person]”.99  In fact we tend to think of immorality as a 
meaning-detractor and this is consistent with my theory of meaning.  For example, Hitler 
does not seem to me to have had a meaningful life.  Even if his life might be described as 
“significant”, this would be meant in the sense of having a significant (negative) impact 
on the world, not in the sense of developing or expressing what is most admirably and 
valuably human.  In fact, Hitler appears to have had a life particularly lacking in 
meaning.  Apart from the fact that he seemed to have engaged in very little meaningful 
behaviour, the morally abhorrent things he did almost certainly undermined what 
meaning his life did have because they did not develop his rational and emotional 
capacities and most importantly because they prevented so many people from exercising 
their capacities for rationality and love.   Thus if getting enhancements is immoral, any 
                                                
99 Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life, p. 23. 
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meaning that they may have contributed by being used for meaningful behaviour might 
be undermined by the decrease in meaning brought about by preventing others from 
developing their capacities for rationality and certain emotions as well as not expressing 
these values in one’s own (immoral) behaviour.  If enhancements had an over-all 
negative impact on society that seriously limited the amount of meaningful behaviour 
most people could engage in (for example, that allowed a majority of the population to 
suffer from poverty by using state funds for developing cybernetic technology rather than 
poverty alleviation), then this could have the result of seriously decreasing the amount of 
meaning enhancements could contribute to anyone in that society since anyone who 
became enhanced in such a society would be implicitly showing disregard for the 
development of rational and emotional capacities generally (assuming that people 
preoccupied with survival would have little time or opportunity for developing these 
capacities).  I would like to avoid the conclusion that cybernetic enhancements could 
increase meaning in our lives to such a negligible extent, and so it would be useful to 
know how such a situation could be avoided. 
 
One way to avoid the possibility of people using enhancements for evil ends is to ensure 
that there are intensive physical and mental tests administered to anyone seeking 
enhancements.  This might not eliminate risk altogether, but if all reasonable measures 
are taken in the development and protection of the technology, the remaining risk would 
probably be worth the possible benefits of enhancements to the world.  
 
Another danger that would need to be dealt with by the use of intensive tests is that some 
people could get carried away and obsessive about getting new enhancements just as 
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some people get carried away and obsessive about getting plastic surgery.  This kind of 
focus on enhancements for the sake of vanity, that is, for the sake of being better than 
others, is likely to seriously detract from the meaning that enhancements are able to 
contribute to lives.  One reason is that such an attitude betrays a lack of commitment to 
the good, and rather a commitment to elevating oneself, something that is morally 
objectionable since it is likely to prevent the person in charge from acting morally, or at 
least virtuously.  Another reason why vanity and obsessiveness could detract from 
meaning is that meaningful relationships would probably be compromised if people 
started getting competitive about enhancements.  Again, the best way to prevent this 
would seem to be testing for appropriate candidates for enhancements. 
 
Can enhancements undermine meaning by being morally questionable in terms of 
fairness? 
 
Just who is allowed to be enhanced and under which conditions is a question that people 
are likely to be very concerned about, if powerful cybernetic enhancements become a real 
possibility.  Schermer suggests that one reason to think that enhancements should be 
impermissible both in sport and in education is that it amounts to “cheating”,100 where 
cheating is defined as breaking the rules and thereby gaining an unfair advantage.  
Enhanced beings might have more opportunities for meaning, which might seem morally 
suspect, and there are many other areas where enhancements could provide a significant 
advantage for cyborgs over unenhanced people, for example in terms of pleasure or 
power.  It seems safe to assume that rules need to be just or at least appropriate ones if 
                                                
100 Schermer, “On the Argument that Enhancement is ‘Cheating’,” p.  85. 
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breaking them is to be considered particularly morally bad, so the important question here 
is whether it is particularly morally bad for someone to get enhancements that provide 
advantage to those who are enhanced.  If so, then there is good reason for there to be 
rules against enhancements.  Furthermore, if it is particularly morally bad to do things 
that provide one with greater opportunities, then the meaning that arises from such a 
choice might be undermined by the immorality of the choice.  
 
In school situations we might think that the unfairness of getting enhanced results from 
there being a violation of the understanding that those who are competing are unenhanced 
– i.e. an understanding that what is being tested and compared in races and tests are 
pupils’ unenhanced abilities.  However, outside such competitive forums the matter of 
whether an advantage counts as “unfair” seems to depend both on whether other people 
have access to it, and on whether there is particularly bad deprivation caused in the 
process of an individual’s getting enhanced.  It seems to me that it would only be 
particularly unfair, and thus morally bad, to get enhancements that place one at an 
advantage if the advantages attained through being enhanced deprives others of important 
goods and if the good impact one makes on the world through their use is not 
considerable.  If the enhancements are used for meaningful behaviour, the other 
advantages (such as power or pleasure, or at least less pain) that may come along with 
them might be acceptable, even if they are not available to everyone, since meaningful 
behaviour tends to have a positive effect on the world and the lives of other people.  For 
example, many people do not resent vocalist Bono from the band U2 for having the 
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advantages of fame and wealth since he uses both his fame and wealth for charitable 
projects.   
 
However, as I mentioned in the beginning of the section, it seems that deprivation of 
important goods may well be a result of people getting enhancements.   Many have 
expressed concern that cybernetic enhancement will exacerbate social inequality since 
they would presumably only be available to a certain income bracket and because 
government resources would be directed here instead of towards the more pressing needs 
of the poor.  This again could mean a loss of meaning for those who get enhanced if one 
accepts Ronald Dworkin’s claim that advantages that result from injustice tend not to 
enhance meaning.101  
 
There seems to be good reason for the government to subsidize enhancements for 
everyone, but the plausibility of this will depend on how much these enhancements will 
cost, and it seems that they are likely to cost a lot.  For these reasons, and because of the 
possibility of abuse of enhancements (that is, their use for evil ends), it seems to me that 
the process of allowing or subsidizing enhancements needs to be based on a rigorous 
testing of a person’s commitment to good, and to the particular activity or achievement 
that the enhancement will help to make possible.  With the use of advanced lie-detector 
tests and personality questionnaires, hopefully some of this risk can be eliminated.  Some 
inequality may be worth the amount of meaning that will be created by only some people 
using these enhancements, and it would be reasonable for people to accept that only some 
people be given the enhancements if everyone, and especially the worst off, are likely to 
                                                
101 Richard Dworkin: “Equality and the Good Life,” Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000): p. 264-267.  
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benefit from them indirectly through the impact of cyborgs on the world (for example, 
lives saved or art produced).   
 
Cybernetic enhancements could also be thought to have negative ethical implications 
because the development and manufacture of such technology is forecast to cause terrible 
environmental damage.102  Having such a negative impact on the world is bound to 
decrease meaningfulness of a life according to many accounts of meaning in life, 
especially utilitarian conceptions,103 that connect meaning with having a positive effect 
on the world.  There is space on my account too for this view since a negative effect on 
the world can include bringing about conditions under which it is more difficult to 
develop one’s admirably human capacities, for example conditions of pollution, scarcity 
of resources or political turmoil.  However, even if the manufacture of enhancements is 
costly to the environment, cyborgs might be able to reduce some of this damage.  For 
example, enhanced firemen could put out fires and save the environment some of the 
damage the fire would have caused.  Some have suggested that nano-technology will be 
capable of remedying some of our most pressing problems, including world hunger and 
environmental damage,104 so in this way at least some of the negative consequences of 
cybernetic enhancement could conceivably be reduced or eliminated, especially if super-
scientists with memory implants are working in the field.  Certainly these are risks, but 
given the state of the world currently, it seems reasonable to take a few risks if the results 
are sufficiently likely and if they can result in as much good as it appears enhancements 
might result in. 
 
                                                
102 Michael Giancola, “Does Transhumanism Mesh with Humanist Values?” The Humanist 64 (2004): pp. 
35-36.  
103 Thaddeus Metz, “Utilitarianism and the Meaning of Life,” Utilitas 15 (2003): pp. 52-53. 
104 Carl Elliott, “Humanity 2.0,” The Wilson Quarterly 27 (2003): p. 16. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Would obtaining cybernetic enhancement not increase meaning in life since eliminating 
certain disabilities does not? 
 
Some parents of deaf children, and especially deaf parents, oppose allowing young 
children (and especially babies) to get cochlear implants.  One reason for this seems to be 
the conviction that the life of a deaf person, while different, is no less meaningful than 
that of a hearing person, since “not every limitation is a loss".105  If a life lacking a 
capacity altogether can be just as meaningful as one not lacking it, then surely a life with 
enhanced capacities is no more meaningful than one with unenhanced ones.  In this 
section I will be considering why one might think that a deaf person’s life would not 
increase in meaning after she had a cochlear implant, and argue that these reasons are 
consistent with thinking that enhancements can, in certain cases, contribute meaning to a 
                                                
105 Anita Silvers, “People with Disabilities,” in Hugh Lafollette, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Practical 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): p. 307. 
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life. I conclude that while a deaf person’s life need not be less meaningful than a hearing 
person’s life, it does not follow that enhancements cannot add meaning to life. 
 
What reason is there to think that the life of a deaf person is no less meaningful than that 
of a hearing person other than reasons previously given?  One of the reasons that 
disability rights theorists point out is that the unique phenomenology of certain 
disabilities106 would be lost with cochlear implants, and it seems that, analogously, 
cybernetic enhancement might also be guilty of homogenization107 since it would seem to 
raise abilities of those who underwent it to the same level.  In other words, there is the 
possibility of the loss of certain perspectives on life.  People’s problem with this might be 
similar to the kind of problem that some people have with the loss of certain languages 
and cultures: in other words, it seems to be driven by the intuition that there is value in 
diversity and variety for its own sake.  This is also arguably one of the reasons we have 
for attempting to conserve wild environments: to conserve the diversity of life to be 
found in them.   
 
However, given the scope of possibility for enhancements, it may actually be the case 
that more variety of human beings would be created because of the variety of purposes 
for which enhancements can be acquired: some people might get wings, others tails, 
some might trade their body parts for smaller ones in order to fit into small spaces, while 
others might choose to become giants.  My opponent could argue that as the problems of 
the world are slowly combated, and as technology improves there will be less need for a 
                                                
106 Vivienne Muller, “Constituting Christopher: Disability Theory and Mark Haddon’s ‘The Curious 
Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time,’” Papers: Explorations into Children’s Literature 16 (2006): p 124. 
107 Silvers, “People with Disabilities,” p. 310. 
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variety of implants, and cyborgs will all become super-men with near–to–invincible and 
alarmingly similar looking bodies and consequently have similar perspectives on the 
world.  There does seem to be some plausibility to me in the intuition that diversity is 
valuable, but I do not think that homogenization is inevitable, since it could be prevented 
by those who are in charge of authorising enhancements.  Furthermore, it seems that it 
would be possible for more variety of perspective to be created by enhancements since 
people could experiment with different perspectives by swapping enhancements (here I 
am thinking mostly of sensory enhancements).  For example, people could conceivably 
even choose to be deaf for a while and then get hearing implants.  Thus homogenisation 
of perspectives is not inevitable.  For reasons of diversity it should not be the case that 
enhancements ever become compulsory: thus if blind people chose to remain blind, they 
will be free to do so. 
 
Furthermore, parents of deaf children argue that the relationship between them and their 
child would suffer were the child to get cochlear implants, since the child would be less 
likely to learn sign language, and thus less likely to communicate with her parents.  Here 
it seems that the threat to meaningfulness, which could be expected to find a parallel with 
cybernetic enhancement, is that relationships might be put under pressure or damaged. In 
the case of enhancement the reasons might be a failure to relate to the “enhanced” person, 
jealousy or feelings of inadequacy from the “unenhanced” person, as well as 
competitiveness, as I have already mentioned in the previous chapter. Thus it seems 
possible that unequal distribution of cybernetic enhancement could bring about less 
meaningful relationships. 
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Government subsidy of nationwide enhancement may help to avoid this.  Anyhow, 
jealousy, competitiveness, failure to relate and feelings of inadequacy arise in the world 
as we know it today without the kinds of enhancements we have been discussing because 
of natural gaps in abilities of people.  If enhancements are only given to people on the 
basis of their displaying commitment to the good and to the activity in question, any 
hostility of others towards enhanced people would seem to be misplaced.  Enhanced 
people would not have acquired such enhancements due to being blessed with good 
genes, or at least, their acquiring enhancements would be less dependent on their genes as 
on their current beliefs and intentions.  Even if beliefs and intentions are to an extent 
shaped by genes and upbringing, chance at least plays less of a role than it seems to play 
in people being born with amazing athletic skill, for example.  Being born with talent is 
less admirable than having a strong commitment to the good.  For this reason, I think that 
instead of jealousy, people are more likely to feel admiration towards cyborgs, and to feel 
inspired to strive to develop a similar commitment in themselves.  Feelings of 
inadequacy, competitiveness and failure to relate to cyborgs might be inevitable in some 
people, but are a small price to pay for the meaning contributed by cyborgs. 
 
Another way to argue that the life of a deaf person is no less meaningful than that of a 
hearing person is to argue, as E.M. Adams does, that a life is meaningful to the extent 
that a person fulfils her potential and makes use of her capacities.108  Similarly to Adams, 
Ronald Dworkin argues that it is not the specific circumstances of a person that are 
                                                
108 E. M. Adams, “The Meaning of Life,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 51 (2002): p. 
80. 
 
  95 
 
important for meaningfulness, but rather how the person responds within these.109  On 
Adams’ view cybernetic enhancements would make no difference to the meaning of the 
lives of ordinary people, since what is important is to fulfil one’s own potential, not to 
compare one’s performance to other superior or even average human beings.  On this 
view cyborgs’ lives would not increase in meaning either, since an increase in meaning 
would depend on their making better use of whatever capabilities they had, enhanced or 
unenhanced, not on whether they had more capabilities or not.   
 
However, this view seems implausible to me since I think it is natural to attribute more 
meaning to people like Mother Teresa and Gandhi’s lives than those of ordinary people, 
and it is clear that many people do not have the capacity for self-sacrifice that these 
people do.  According to Adams’ theory Mother Teresa and Gandhi’s lives might be even 
less meaningful than the life of someone who achieved less than them, but who achieved 
a higher percentage of what she was capable of achieving, and this seems unintuitive.  
Another way to see this is to consider Metz’s case of someone who was captured and 
imprisoned in a cage. On Adams’ view this person has a very meaningful life since he is 
achieving exactly what he is capable of given the circumstances: namely, extraordinarily 
little.110  People have different capacities and it seems in some cases that those who have 
more capacity for meaningful behaviour than others do, and actually use this capacity, 
will have more meaningful lives than those who have inferior capacity, even if the latter 
fulfil their potential to the fullest.   
                                                
109 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000): p. 260. 
110 Thaddeus Metz, “Imperfection as Sufficient for a Meaningful Life: How Much is Enough?” in Yujin 
Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg, eds., New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (New York: Palgrave 
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It is more admirable, and often more morally admirable, to respond in certain ways rather 
than others to particularly terrible situations, or to use what capacities we do have as 
much as we can, even if they pale in comparison to those of others.  Thus I would not 
deny that such lives have meaning.  However, situations such as living under a brutal 
dictatorship or having to live with a particularly debilitating disease nonetheless seem to 
be serous meaning detractors, as I have argued in Chapter Two, p. 36.   
 
Lastly, a clear reason why it is not the case that simply by lacking a capacity deaf people 
have less meaningful lives is that deaf people can make up for any lack of meaning that 
deafness may bring about in other ways, for example, by including other meaningful 
elements such as meaningful relationships.  The more a deaf person uses the capacities he 
does have for meaningful behaviour, the more likely he is to increase the meaning of his 
life.   Even though deaf people need not have less meaningful lives than those with 
hearing, it does not follow that cyborgs have less meaningful lives since what is 
important is that a life contain valuable elements, not that a life have a certain number of 
capacities.  Thus, less capacities need not entail less meaning in a life, but not using the 
capacities one does have, or only using these to a weak degree so that one’s life does not 
include meaningful elements, does entail that a person will have a less meaningful life.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that certain cybernetic enhancements, when used in certain 
ways, could increase the meaningfulness of one’s life.  I have argued that activities and 
achievements are meaningful in virtue of expressing or developing what is most 
admirably or valuably human about us, and that by engaging in more meaningful 
activities and achieving more meaningful results, one can (in many cases considerably) 
increase the meaningfulness of one’s life.  I have argued that enhancements need not 
eliminate the need for effort, virtues or skills, or decrease any meaningfulness these 
elements add to our lives.  I have also argued that they need not render us other than what 
we are in such a way that undermines their meaningfulness. I have considered whether 
becoming a cyborg would be in some way immoral and thus not increase the 
meaningfulness of one’s life and have concluded that even if this is sometimes the case, 
this does not undermine my argument since I am only committed to the claim that certain 
behaviour made possible by enhancements can increase meaningfulness of a life.  Lastly I 
have argued that the meaningfulness enhancements can contribute to lives need not be 
undermined by the common intuition that meaningfulness depends on how one responds 
within the circumstances presented to one. Thus I hope to have shown that there is no 
reason why becoming a cyborg cannot, in certain cases, increase the meaningfulness of a 
person’s life.   
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